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Crime Spectators and the Tort of
Objectification
Amelia J. Uelmen
12 U. MASS. L. REV. 68
ABSTRACT
Reports of how some bystanders interact with victims on the scene of an emergency
are shocking. Instead of assisting or calling for help, these individuals take pictures
or recordings of the victims on their cell phones. This Article concentrates on the
question of whether such an interaction with a victim might in certain circumstances
constitute a distinct and legally actionable harm. This Article proposes a new tort:
exploitative objectification of a person in need of emergency assistance. It works to
articulate the moral and legal foundations for an argument that treating a person in
need of emergency assistance as an object of amusement should be considered a
legally cognizable harm. Cognizant of concerns about over-breadth and moral
overload, it clearly distinguishes between those who cross the line of engaging the
scene and the victim (“engaged spectators”) and those who do not (“pure
bystanders”). It argues for ample space for discretion in the decision whether to
engage, respecting subjective assessments of risks and priorities as grounded in the
emotional and interior life of the bystander.
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I. INTRODUCTION

F

or many law students, the discussion of the common law no-duty
to rescue is almost a rite of passage. At some point in the first-year
torts curriculum, the discussion presents itself as a kind of marker of
whether or not they have entered into the realm of “thinking like a
lawyer.” The problem of “easy” rescue, understood as a bystander’s
response to an emergency situation that would impose no or miniscule
risk to the bystander, lends itself to shocking hypothetical fact patterns.
For example, a two-year old child is drowning in a wading pool,
and a passerby, with no danger to herself, could easily pull the child
out of the water. Does the passerby have any legal duty to help?
Consider an example from the second Restatement of Torts: “A sees B,
a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an approaching
automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a word or touch
without delaying his own progress.”1 Does A have any legal duty to
prevent B from stepping into the street?
In almost all jurisdictions in the United States, the answer is no.2
When A does not alert B to the approaching automobile, and B is
subsequently run over and hurt, A is not liable to B because A is under
no legal duty to prevent B from stepping into the street.3 And the
drowning person? As leading torts commentator William Prosser
graphically described, even an expert swimmer, rope in hand, “who
sees another drowning before his eyes, is not required to do anything
at all about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette and watch
the man drown.”4
Discussions may also include the case of Kitty Genovese, brutally
attacked and stabbed to death in her quiet middle-class Queens, New
York neighborhood. As the story goes, at least thirty-eight neighbors
heard her screams as she lay bleeding, and the police did not receive
their first call until half an hour after the attack.5 Debates frequently
1
2

3
4
5

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 cmt. c, illus. 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
As discussed infra, at note 7, a few states have amended their penal codes to
include a statutory duty to rescue.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 cmt. c, illus. 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 340 (4th ed. 1971).
Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call Police, N.Y. TIMES, March
27, 1964, http://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/27/37-who-saw-murder-didnt-callthe-police.html [https://perma.cc/F6UY-AGNQ] (the Author notes the
inconsistency in the title of this article); see also Charles Mohr, Apathy is Puzzle
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focus on the action or inaction of one or more bystanders in relation to
the primary injury: what should A have done to try to save B from the
peril, or at least to mitigate the harm? In the Genovese case of a crowd,
how might one determine which A should have done something?
The focus of this Article is different. Considering the reaction of A
to the violence, it queries whether A’s response to the injury of
violence constitutes a distinct harm to B. If instead of alerting B to the
danger, A takes a cell phone picture of B stepping into the street—
might that be a distinct, and legally cognizable harm?
II. SEINFELD’S GUIDE TO BYSTANDER OBLIGATIONS
To illustrate this distinction, this Part turns first to a venerable
guide to U.S. law and culture: the Seinfeld television series, and
specifically to the well-known “Finale” of May 1998.6 As noted above,
the common law has been reluctant to impose legal sanctions on
bystanders for failure to assist in an emergency, but some states have
experimented with criminal statutes.7 The Seinfeld “Finale” is perhaps
one of the most interesting cultural commentaries on these efforts.

6

7

in
Queens
Killing,
N.Y.
Times,
Mar.
28,
1964,
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/28/apathy-is-puzzle-in-queen-skilling.html
[https://perma.cc/D9KN-W7WF]; Abraham M. Rosenthal, Thirty-Eight
Witnesses (1964).
Seinfeld: Finale (NBC television broadcast May 14, 1998), http://seinfeldepisode.blogspot.com/2013/07/the-finale.html [https://perma.cc/Z43C-QZTB];
see
also
Seinfeld
Scripts,
The
Finale,
http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheFinale.htm
[https://perma.cc/4LC2-385G]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. 640A.01(1) (West 1996) (requiring reasonable
assistance at the scene of an emergency); R.I. Gen. Laws 11-56-1 (1994) (same);
Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973) (“A person who knows that another is
exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered
without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important duties
owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that
assistance or care is being provided by others.”). In Massachusetts, bystanders
are not required to provide assistance, but are required to report violent or sexual
crimes to which they are a witness. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 268, § 40 (West
1990) (“Whoever knows that another person is a victim of aggravated rape,
murder, manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime shall, to
the extent that said person can do so without danger or peril to himself or others,
report said crime to an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as
reasonably practicable.”). Similar statutes have been enacted in Florida, Hawaii,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.027 (West 1992); Hawaii
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The four main characters in the series—hard-bitten cynical and
sarcastic New Yorkers Jerry, George, Elaine, and Kramer—find
themselves in the fictional small town of Latham, Massachusetts,
awaiting repairs on a plane that had made a safe emergency landing.
While paused on the sidewalk, the group looks across the street and
sees an assailant holding up an overweight man at gun point, then
taking his wallet and stealing his car.
Kramer, video-camera in hand, says, “I want to capture this,” and
films the event, which also records audio of the other three observers
making wise-cracks about the incident and about the victim’s weight.8
After making a sarcastic comment, Jerry proceeds to place a call on his
mobile phone—not to report the robbery, but to check in on the
progress of the plane repairs. When a police officer appears on the
scene, the crime victim gestures towards the four witnesses. They are
arrested for a violation of a recently enacted “Good Samaritan Law,”
which, as the officer explained, “requires you to help or assist anyone
in danger as long as it’s reasonable to do so.”9 They are taken to a
holding cell at the local jail.

8

9

Rev. Stat. § 663-1.6 (1993); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.69.100 (West 1998);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34 (West 1996). California imposes a duty to report when
the victim is a child. Cal. Penal Code § 152.3 (West 2016). Ohio imposes a
general duty to report a felony. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.22 (West 1997);
see also Restatement (Third) of Torts § 38 (Am. Law Inst. 2011) (“When a
statute requires an actor to act for the protection of another, the court may rely
on the statute to decide that an affirmative duty exists and to determine the scope
of the duty.”); see generally Eugene Volokh, Duty to Rescue / Report Statues
(Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.volokh.com/2009/11/03/duty-to-rescuereportstatutes [https://perma.cc/J2M8-ZRSR].
See, e.g., Finale Script, supra note 6 (Jerry: “Well, there goes the money for the
lipo!” | Elaine: “See, the great thing about robbing a fat guy is it’s an easy
getaway. You know? They can’t really chase ya!” | George: “He’s actually
doing him a favor. It’s less money for him to buy food.”).
From their jail cell they glean more information: “Elaine: The Good Samaritan
Law? Are they crazy? | George: Why would we want to help somebody? |
Elaine: I know. | George: That’s what nuns and Red Cross workers are for. |
Kramer: The Samaritans were an ancient tribe - very helpful to people. | Elaine:
Alright – um, excuse me, hi, could you tell me what kind of law this is. | Deputy:
Well, they just passed it last year. It’s modeled after the French law. I heard
about it after Princess Diana was killed and all those photographers were just
standing around. . . . Deputy: You’re the first ones to be arrested on it, probably
in the whole country. | George: All right, so what’s the penalty here? Let’s just
pay the fine or something and get the hell out of here. | Deputy: Well, it’s not
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When they call to retain an attorney, Jackie Chiles (a parody of
Johnnie Cochran), exclaims, “Good Samaritan Law? I never heard of
it. You don’t have to help anybody. That’s what this country’s all
about. That’s deplorable, unfathomable, improbable.”10
A. Legal Accountability for “Mocking and Maligning”?
Because this was the first trial of its kind, the extremely zealous
Seinfeld prosecutor digs up every bit of character evidence to show
that the attitude of the four bystanders in this instance was simply a
manifestation of a lifetime of “criminal indifference.”11 The opening
statement for the prosecution captures well the moral outrage that
seems to drive many proposals for enforcing a legal duty to rescue:
Hoyt: Ladies and gentlemen, last year, our City
Council, by a vote of twelve to two, passed a Good
Samaritan Law. Now, essentially, we made it a crime to
ignore a fellow human being in trouble. Now this group
from New York not only ignored, but, as we will prove,
they actually mocked the victim as he was being robbed
at gunpoint.
I can guarantee you one other thing, ladies and
gentlemen, this is not the first time they have behaved in
this manner. On the contrary, they have quite a record
of mocking and maligning. This is a history of
selfishness, self-absorption, immaturity, and greed.
And you will see how everyone who has come into
contact with these four individuals has been abused,
wronged, deceived and betrayed. This time, they have
gone too far. This time they are going to be held
accountable. This time, they are the ones who will
pay.12

10
11

12

that easy. Now see, the law calls for a maximum fine of $85,000 and as much as
five years in prison.” Id.
Id.
Fortunately for Seinfeld fans, the episode’s portrayal through trial witnesses of
vignettes of sarcasm, often at the expense of others, is also a humorous walk
down the series’ memory lane.
Finale Script, supra note 6.
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The prosecutor’s statement builds on a kind of gut moral instinct
that people should be held “accountable” for their “mocking and
maligning,” especially when it reflects a deeper pattern of “selfishness,
self-absorption, immaturity, and greed.” Particularly, when such
conduct results in others being “abused, wronged, deceived and
betrayed,” many are ready to entertain the idea that the behavior rises
to the level of public censure and legal sanction.13
Note the large gap between the Seinfeld statute under which the
four characters were charged and the driving force of the prosecutor’s
opening statement. As the officer explained, the four were arrested for
violation of a recently enacted law that would require them “to help or
assist anyone in danger as long as it’s reasonable to do so.” The statute
did not delineate a duty to “rescue” in the sense that it required
physical intervention, or some other direct interruption of the causal
chain of events that led to the initial harm. Remember that in this case
the assailant was armed, while the victim and the four witnesses were
unarmed. “Reasonable” action under the circumstances would have
had to account for these risks.
The prosecutor’s opening statement takes the case in a very
different direction. It does not focus on the witnesses’ failure to
intervene or to call for help. Instead, there is a clear tension between
his description of the law—”Now essentially, we made it a crime to
ignore a fellow human being in trouble”—and the driving force of his
argument against the four: not that they had ignored the victim, but the
opposite, namely that they inflicted a distinct harm, “they actually
mocked the victim as he was being robbed at gunpoint.”14 The conduct
that was on trial in the Finale was not so much an attitude of
indifference, but that they had inflicted distinct harms, corroborated by
character evidence of how they had inflicted similar harms on other
vulnerable people. Thus the prosecutor’s case consisted in presenting a
record of “mocking and maligning” grounded in a “history of
13

14

See id. The sentencing scene: “[Judge] Vandelay: Will the defendants please
rise. And how do you find, with respect to the charge of criminal indifference? |
Foreman: We find the defendants - guilty. | Vandelay: Order! Order in this court,
I will clear this room! I do not know how, or under what circumstances the four
of you found each other, but your callous indifference and utter disregard for
everything that is good and decent has rocked the very foundation upon which
our society is built. I can think of nothing more fitting than for the four of you to
spend a year removed from society so that you can contemplate the manner in
which you have conducted yourselves.”
Id.
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selfishness, self-absorption, immaturity, and greed,” with the resulting
damage that “everyone who ha[d] come into contact with [the] four
individuals ha[d] been abused, wronged, deceived and betrayed.”15
Focusing on the gap between the Seinfeld statute and the
prosecutor’s argument, the eye is drawn not to the failure to help per
se, but the aspect of a bystander’s conduct that may constitute
“mocking and maligning.” When a bystander stops to focus on the
scene of an accident or assault, notices that the victim is in need of
emergency assistance, and engages in conduct that expresses
disrespect for the humanity of the victim and this person’s particular
need for assistance, this is not doing nothing. Thus one might query:
might the law recognize that at some point these expressions of
“selfishness and self-absorption” do constitute a kind of abuse—a
wrong—that should have a civil remedy in law?
Concerns about a particular form of “mocking and maligning”
have crystallized with the pervasive presence of recording devices
such as cell phones. Like Kramer with his video-camera in the Finale
scene, those who take cell phone pictures are hardly ignoring the
victim or doing nothing. Rather, they are engaging the attack by
focusing on it, and filming or photographing it. Such conduct
objectifies and exploits another human being precisely at a moment in
which this person is vulnerable. In many situations, this objectification
and exploitation is exacerbated by subsequently posting the
photograph or video recording on social media.
B. The Prevalence of “Mocking and Maligning” Today
Consider a recent incident of a man beaten up outside of New York
City’s Port Authority Bus Terminal. In the early morning hours of
March 31, 2014, Jose Robles (“Robles”) took a bus from New Jersey
to the main bus depot in Manhattan, as part of his regular commute to
his job as a manager of the Carnegie Deli on 57th Street. At about 5:45
a.m., as he tried to hail a cab outside of the bus terminal, an assailant
approached him from behind. Robles recounted: “All of a sudden this
guy got in front of me and dove at me. He hit me in the eye and I went
down.”16 As the attacker started to kick him, he struggled to his feet to
try to fight him off, but his left arm had been shattered. Robles
recounted, “He wouldn’t stop. I tried to get up again, but he grabbed
15
16

Id.
Id.
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my jacket and spun me around and he grabbed my shoes and threw
them in the street and started kicking me again.”17
The near-dawn street was not deserted; a number of bystanders
were watching the incident unfold—some from behind their cell
phones. As Robles described the scene: “People were watching and
they were having a good time filming.”18 Dismayed that no one tried
to assist or shout for help, he managed to pull out his own cell phone
and call the police. As he dialed 9-1-1, the assailant yelled, “That’s my
phone”—which Robles surmised was an effort to trick onlookers into
believing the assailant was the victim.19 “I called for help, but people
were just filming on their cell phones. I ran into the Port Authority and
cops were coming down the escalator.”20 The assailant followed
Robles inside the terminal and hid when he saw the police. Robles
identified the assailant, who was subsequently arrested.21
Interviewed from his hospital bed, Robles reflected that while the
attack was bad enough, the behavior of witnesses was worse: “I want
people to have a little more conscience.”22 As one headline mused,
“Deli Manager Mercilessly Beaten as NYC Onlookers Just Stare”—a
“Modern Day Kitty Genovese?”23

17

18
19
20
21
22
23

Kerry Burke, Tina Moore & Bill Hutchinson, Port Authority Attack Victim Says
Bystanders Snapped Photos Instead of Calling for Help, N.Y. Daily News (Apr.
1, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/port-authorityattack-victim-angry-do-nothing-witnesses-article-1.1742519
[https://perma.cc/YUB6-DSAH]. Other coverage insures that this was not an
April Fool Day story. See, e.g., Aaron Feis, Carnegie Deli Manager Attacked by
a
Homeless
Man,
N.Y.
Post
(Apr.
2,
2014),
http://nypost.com/2014/04/02/carnegie-deli-manager-attacked-by-homeless-man
[https://perma.cc/DAR8-FNKC].
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Modern Day Kitty Genovese? Deli Manager Mercilessly Beaten in NYC as
Onlookers
Just
Stare,
Fox
News
Latino
(Apr.
2,
2014),
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2014/04/02/deli-manager-mercilesslyman-beaten-in-middle-nyc-as-onlookers-just-stare
[https://perma.cc/ZCV3PL33].
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Robles was certainly not alone in registering his dismay for how
bystanders respond to violence.24 One might, in some sense,
understand how mental instability or extreme circumstances may have
led the assailant, a homeless man, to snap into a violent rage. Robles’s
real rage seems to be reserved for what he sensed was callous
indifference on the part of the bystanders who, from the other side of
their phones, appeared oblivious to his trauma. Instead, they turned his
urgent need for assistance into a spectacle, as if it were simply a scene
in a movie.
Sadly, the behavior of bystanders in the Robles attack is not an
isolated incident. The daily papers carry frequent accounts of
bystanders gathering to snap cell phone pictures of assaults, rapes, and
even murders, as well as more run-of-the-mill accidents.25
24

25

A comment to the New York Daily News web article about the Robles attack
from a writer who identifies as “Pissed about Everything” reads: “I am so tired
of people and their cell phones. The worst invention ever. Society crumbles
while people stare into their stupid phones.” See Burke et al., supra note 17 (first
comment). Not surprisingly, the follow up comments chide the writer for
overstatement and for neglecting the positive side of the invention, including
that in this very case a cell phone was used to call for help. But we get the drift.
See, e.g., Associated Press, No One Made an Effort: Arrest Made After
Bystanders Watch Subway Death, Sydney Morning Herald News (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://www.smh.com.au/world/no-one-made-an-effort-arrest-made-afterbystanders-watch-subway-death-20121205-2awka.html [https://perma.cc/S6VBN3FJ]; Max Fisher, China’s Bystander Problem: Another Death After Crowd
Ignores
Woman
in
Peril,
Wash.
Post
(Oct.
24,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/10/24/chinasbystander-problem-another-death-after-crowd-ignores-woman-in-peril
[https://perma.cc/RWT8-BE9B] (security cameras showed over a dozen people
gawking and taking pictures of a woman whose head was caught between traffic
rails; 30 minutes passed before someone thought to help); Madison Gray, The
Subway Shove Homicide: How Two New Yorkers’ Lives Became Tragically
Linked, Time (Dec. 6, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/12/06/the-subwayshove-homicide-how-two-new-yorkers-lives-became-tragically-linked
[https://perma.cc/3EAE-Q7ZP] (accounts of how bystanders took pictures and
filmed as man pushed onto tracks stared down an oncoming subway train); Joe
Kemp, ‘I became really afraid’: New Jersey mom pummeled in front of her 2year-old son feared for child during brutal attack, N.Y. Daily News (June 27,
2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/new-jersey-mompummeled-front-2-year-old-son-feared-child-brutal-attack-article-1.1846214
[https://perma.cc/LZ88-CL5T] (during fight in a parking lot between two
McDonald’s co-workers during which several bystanders recorded the
confrontation instead of calling for help); Edgar Sandoval & Bill Hutchinson,
Widow, daughter of man pushed to his death on subway tracks outraged by New
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Recently, an Internet subculture has also developed in which those
who witness violent assaults stand by to record the incidents without
intervening, and then they post the videos on social media. For some,
aspects of this phenomenon have coalesced around a website named
“WorldStar Hiphop.”26 According to one estimate this site garners 3.4
million visitors and 17 million page views per day.27
Some of the assaults are staged,28 but many are not, and witnesses
often encounter the scenes through happenstance. In several of these
situations, authorities learned that wrongdoing had occurred only once
the videos had reached viral status.29 For example, in one November
2011 incident on the New York City subway, a witness recorded a
man leaning against the doors of the car telling another man to stop
spitting on the train; almost immediately, three men attacked the man
near the door and savagely beat him.30 Throughout the video,
witnesses visibly laughed as the victim was repeatedly punched and

26
27

28

29

30

York Post front page photo, N.Y. Daily News (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/relatives-man-pushed-death-outragedphoto-article-1.1213683 [https://perma.cc/6KJD-H9B2].
World Star Hip Hop, http://worldstarhiphop.com (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016).
See Craig D. Lindsey, On Culture: WorldStar is portal to what’s wrong with
mankind,
The
News
&
Observer
(Apr.
18,
2015),
http://www.newsobserver.com/entertainment/ent-columnsblogs/article18750474.html [https://perma.cc/5TKG-QDYH]. Many thanks to
James Simmons for alerting me to this phenomenon and for research assistance
on this section.
See Lacey Lett, Disturbing Fight Video in Oklahoma City Brings Awareness to
Alarming Trend, KFOR (Dec. 7, 2015), http://kfor.com/2015/12/07/disturbingfight-video-in-oklahoma-city-brings-awareness-to-alarming-trend
[https://perma.cc/C6FV-BV2U] (quoting a social media expert who described
how “there’s a whole popular sub-culture on the internet of people staging fights
and then recording it, and then putting it on the internet because, in their world,
that’s how you gain popularity.”).
See, e.g., Amanda Milkovits, Two Arrested After Providence Fight Video
Featuring Samurai Sword Goes Viral, Providence Journal (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20150924/NEWS/150929613
[https://perma.cc/ZPW8-FKCY] (in which a couple fights with a neighbor as
children are heard screaming “Mommy!” in the background. Police only began
investigating once they were tipped off six days later after the video had reached
781,000 views.).
NYPD Seek Three Men in Brutal L Train Beating (VIDEO), Huffington Post
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/16/nypd-seek-threemen-in-br_n_1097472.html [https://perma.cc/A9Z4-ABEA].
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kicked after falling to the ground.31 At the 50-second mark, one
woman yelled “WorldStar baby!”32 In the video, the witnesses can be
seen moving to another car, where they continue to record the fight
through the window and laugh while the victim, left alone and
bleeding profusely, tried to regain his balance.33 Only days later, once
the video had reached nearly 50,000 views, did police learn of any
wrongdoing and begin their investigation.34 Similar assaults have been
recorded with alarming regularity on countless street corners, onboard
public transportation, and in schools throughout the country.35
In the aftermath of the New York City subway assault, a columnist
for Gothamist tried to make sense of the phenomenon. He wrote:
The site’s popularity has created a sort of voyeuristic
feedback loop, in which disassociated bystanders
immediately videotape violent incidents and act as if
they’re already watching a video on the Internet. This
particular video serves as a perfect example of how
violence becomes instant entertainment these days: as
the young man is getting brutally beaten, the woman
recording the fight is heard gloating “World Star,
baby!”36
A correspondent for the Boston Globe similarly observed that since
“the drawn-out drama of narrative is edited out for efficiency,” these
types of videos “satisfy our craving for conflict with a quick,

31
32
33
34

35

36

See id.
Id.
See id.
‘L’ Train Attack Caught on Video; Cops Looking for Suspects: Nervous
Straphangers Say Crime Appears to Be Escalating Underground, CBS New
York (Nov. 16, 2011). http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/11/16/l-train-attackcaught-on-video-cops-looking-for-suspects [https://perma.cc/AZ2P-ZPW4].
See Steven Kurutz, The Creator of WorldStarHipHop Plots His Second Act,
N.Y. Times (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/fashion/mensstyle/lee-odenat-creator-of-worldstarhiphop-plots-his-second-act.html
[https://perma.cc/N33V-PV6Q].
John Del Signore, Police Seek 3 Men for Beating L Train Rider Who Scolded
Them
for
Spitting,
Gothamist
(Nov.
16,
2011),
http://gothamist.com/2011/11/16/police_search_for_men_in_beating_of.php
[https://perma.cc/HS9A-XP9Q].
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concentrated dose.”37 For viewers, “there’s a thrill built into
spontaneously caught footage capturing the rare collision of
happenstance and comeuppance.”38 Similarly, sociologist Jeff Ferrell
observed that the phenomenon reflects a culture that has become so
desensitized to violence that observers barely flinch when taking out
their cameras and hitting record: “Violence is normalized as a part of
sitcoms and news coverage and video games. In one fight, a kid really
did go to the hospital with a fractured skull. It’s not fake in that sense,
but it’s immediately perceived as an image.”39
Further, bystanders have much to gain in satisfying this captive
online audience. As one journalist observed, witnesses who upload
these videos are rewarded with “the possibility of being
instantaneously famous” or becoming an “automatic celebrity.”40
Posting a particularly violent video can boost one’s “street cred”
because it demonstrates that the witness risked danger while recording
the scene.41
The creator of WorldStar, Lee O’Denat, places the phenomenon
within a journalistic frame, explaining that it “provides coverage of
communities that larger news organizations like CNN or MSNBC
might ignore. It can be ugly at times, but so is reality.”42 But the fact
remains that bystanders are extracting voyeuristic pleasure from

37
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39

40
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Michael Andor Brodeur, Fight Videos Are Everywhere Online, but Why Do We
Watch
Them?
Boston
Globe
(Aug.
25,
2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/2015/08/24/fight-videos-are-everywhereonline-but-why-watch-them/Zo3otPlzWN23ZK5a7aTNgP/story.html
[https://perma.cc/RLH4-QM9Y].
Id.
Colleen Curry, World Star Hip Hop Provides Home for Fights, Sex and
Violence, ABC News (Feb. 8, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/world-star-hiphop-home-fights-sex-violence/story?id=15493007
[https://perma.cc/K83QJKPN].
Abby Phillip, Worldstar and the Lure of Internet Fame that Drives Teens to
Film
Brutal
Assaults,
Wash.
Post
(Mar.
17,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/16/worldstarand-the-lure-of-internet-fame-that-drives-teens-to-film-brutal-assaults
[https://perma.cc/9W5D-EFFZ].
Id.
Jason Parham, The Man Behind the Web’s Most Controversial Video Site,
Gawker (June 19, 2014), http://gawker.com/the-man-behind-the-webs-mostcontroversial-video-site-1592857533 [https://perma.cc/EN7C-R8C4].
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another person’s pain and need for emergency assistance—oblivious to
their need for immediate medical attention.
Might bystanders in these circumstances, as the Seinfeld
prosecutor argued, be held responsible—not only morally, but also
legally—for this kind of “mocking and maligning?”
C. Concerns about Moral Overload and Over-Breadth
Shifting to the defense perspective, the opening statement for the
Seinfeld defendants taps into another kind of gut moral instinct—the
unfairness of holding some people responsible for the consequences of
another person’s bad actions. Their attorney argues that the
categorization of the four witnesses as bystanders should determine
their innocence:
Chiles: I am shocked and chagrined, mortified and
stupefied. This trial is outrageous! It is a waste of the
taxpayers’ time and money. It is a travesty of justice
that these four people have been incarcerated while the
real perpetrator is walking around laughing—lying and
laughing, laughing and lying.
You know what these four people were? They were
innocent bystanders. Now, you just think about that
term. Innocent. Bystanders. Because that’s exactly what
they were. We know they were bystanders, nobody’s
disputing that. So how can a bystander be guilty? No
such thing. Have you ever heard of a guilty bystander?
No, because you cannot be a bystander and be guilty.
Bystanders are by definition, innocent. That is the
nature of bystanding.
But no, they want to change nature here. They want to
create a whole new animal—the guilty bystander. Don’t
you let them do it. Only you can stop them.43
The defense argument hones in on the category of bystanders as
uninvolved, and therefore, not responsible. Are there circumstances in
which this assessment is exactly right—bystanders are in some sense,
by definition, innocent? If so, how might one sort through the
difference? How might this distinction help to articulate a tort claim
for “mocking and maligning,” or as I frame it, “exploitative
43

Finale Script, supra note 6.
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objectification,” that steers clear of legitimate concerns about moral
overload?
III. THE INTERIOR LIFE OF BYSTANDERS
A. Making Space in the Law for the Interior Life of
Bystanders
One reason why it may be difficult to articulate when it would be
appropriate to hold the Seinfeld characters responsible for the harm
that they caused is because the harm seems to be grounded less in the
performance of a physically observable action (or failure to act), and
more in an interior attitude. The action-oriented focus of the legal and
cultural commentary on cases involving bystanders’ obligations is a
reflection of a broader quest for distilling objective rules and standards
over subjective states of mind.44 This trend has in various ways
obfuscated the potential focus on more subjective elements of the
interior life of bystanders.
Returning to the hypothetical of the expert swimmer, rope in hand,
watching someone drown before her eyes, note the seemingly
objective factors: a perfectly individuated bystander (there is only one
bystander in the example); who is perfectly situated (has a clear view
of what is happening); with the requisite expertise and training;
perfectly equipped and prepared (rope in hand); and we might even
presume an otherwise ready disposition (where quality of an expert
athlete tends to convey a high level of confidence, focus and ability).
In its practical and technical simplicity, the hypothetical ignores
any reference to two factors that often come into play in a bystander’s
response to an emergency. First, it elides the subjective perspective of
the bystander, which embraces not only sensory conditions such as
ability to see and hear, but also psychological factors such as how the
bystander perceives and processes risks and fear. Second, it obscures
the relational complexity that may permeate the various interactions
on the scene, not only between bystanders, victims and perpetrators,

44

See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960 (1992)
(“If there is a single, overriding, and repetitive theme running through Holmes’s
writing, it is the necessity and desirability of establishing objective rules of law,
that is, general rules that do not take the peculiar mental or moral state of
individuals into account.”).
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but also all of their interactions with structures of authority, such as the
police or emergency responders.45
In the common law of torts, when the decision-making process of
bystanders is not invisible or caricatured as some form of moral
monstrosity, it is often depicted as relatively flat. How might we
retrieve a space in the law of torts to bring into full consideration the
complexity of the interior life of bystanders, including how emotional
reactions to trauma and/or violence may have an impact on the
decision-making process? Examining the journalistic accounts of the
bystander villains who failed to help in the well-known case of the
murders of Kitty Genovese, the analysis below highlights the
importance of a multi-faceted analysis that leaves room for the
subjective emotions, fears and psychological limitations of those who
find themselves face-to-face with brutal violence.
B. Bystanders to the Kitty Genovese Murder
March 13, 2014 marked the fiftieth anniversary of a murder that
rocked the world. As recounted by the New York Times article that
went 1960s-style-viral,46 in the early morning hours of March 13,
1964, twenty-nine-year-old Kitty Genovese was returning from work
to her middle-class Queens neighborhood. As she walked the few
blocks to her apartment from the Long Island Railroad parking lot, she
was brutally attacked and stabbed. Neighbors responded to her
screams with lights and shouts, and the attacker retreated, only to
return two more times, continuing the attack, which resulted in her
death. According to the Times, “[f]or more than half an hour 38
45

46

Compare these questions with Antony Honoré’s “easy enough” list of linedrawing factors for imposing a legal duty to rescue. This list, it could be argued,
is also missing the thickness of the bystanders’ subjective perspective and
consideration of various forms of relational complexity: “The relevant factors
are easy enough to list: the gravity of the peril, the chances of successful
intervention, the attitude of the victim, and the likelihood that another betterqualified rescuer will act.” Antony M. Honoré, Law, Morals and Rescue, in The
Good Samaritan and the Law 234 (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966, reprinted 1981)
[hereinafter The Good Samaritan].
See Kevin Cook, Kitty Genovese: The Murder, the Bystanders, the Crime that
Changed America 100 (2014) (“Under the banner of the world’s leading news
source, the New York Times at the height of its influence, a two-week-old story
became a sensation. Newspapers in England, Russia, Japan and the Middle East
picked it up. As recast by Rosenthal and Gansberg, Kitty’s murder had elements
of noir fiction: a gritty urban setting, craven bystanders, a defenseless young
woman.”).
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respectable, law-abiding citizens in Queens watched a killer stalk and
stab a woman in three separate attacks in Kew Gardens.”47 The article
indicated that she lay bleeding for half an hour before the first call
arrived to the police, who came immediately.48 The neighbor who
finally made the belated call to the police sheepishly explained, “I
didn’t want to get involved.”49
The incident generated a wave of deep angst and soul searching:
how could so many witnesses have failed to respond, even with
something as easy as a call to the police? 50 The year following the
attack, the University of Chicago hosted an interdisciplinary
conference that brought together legal theorists, philosophers,
sociologists and journalists to discuss the case and address proposals
for a change in the no-duty-to-rescue rule.51 The passive indifference
and cold-hearted inhumanity of these “thirty-eight witnesses” became
something of a mantra that generated intense public concern.52
The journalist keynote speaker for the conference, Alan Barth,
surmised that the trends of urbanization, industrialization and
“extraordinary mobility” presented a double barrier to bystander
involvement. Decisions to intervene are hindered not only by the
isolation and anonymity that tend to emerge amidst crowds of any
large urban environment, but also by deliberate efforts to seek and
preserve a high degree of privacy.53
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Gansberg, supra note 5; see also Cook, supra note 46, at 78.
See Gansberg, supra note 5, at 1; see also Cook, supra note 46, at 80.
Gansberg, supra note 5.
From a contemporary perspective, it seems strange that no one dialed a 911
emergency line. However, that system was not yet in place. See Gary Allen,
History
of
911,
Dispatch
Magazine
On-Line,
http://www.911dispatch.com/911/history/
[https://perma.cc/U2V4-WJER]
(noting that the first 911 call was placed in February, 1968). See also Charles O.
Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in Good
Samaritan, supra note 45, at 24, 34 (noting that shortly after Genovese’s death
New York instituted an easy-to-remember centralized number to contact the
police).
See generally Good Samaritan, supra note 45 (volume collecting the conference
papers and presentations).
See generally Aleksander Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative
Analysis, in Good Samaritan, supra note 45, at 91.
Alan Barth, The Vanishing Samaritan, in Good Samaritan, supra note 45, at
159, 165; see also id., at 165.
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Over the years, further investigation and scholarship have revealed
that the initial New York Times article was in several respects factually
wrong and seriously misleading.54 While sources for the revisionary
account could be multiple, this discussion refers primarily to a study
by Kevin Cook published on the fiftieth anniversary of the murder
which incorporates much of the previous research and carefully sifts
through what is fact and what is legend. Reconstructing the events and
probing the witnesses’ varying perspectives, Cook’s account helps to
correct the record in several respects: a neighbor actually did call the
police immediately; probably a maximum of two neighbors were in a
position to understand that Genovese was in mortal danger; at least
one of these two had objective reasons to fear contact with the police;
and most significantly, Kitty Genovese did not die alone, but in the
arms of one of her neighbors.55
The next sections consider these elements as part of an
examination of the distortion, or caricature, of the interior life of
bystanders who are part of a crowd. In contrast to an en masse
indictment against “thirty-eight witnesses,” this analysis considers the
extent to which the sensory and subjective perspectives of the various
individual bystanders helps to explain, and for the most part justify,
the instances in which it seemed that there was a lack of response.

54

See Cook, supra note 46, at 99 (noting one reporter’s perspective that under
Rosenthal, the new policy was to “‘fake’ stories and overdramatize events.”),
204-11 (discussing recent sources for a revision of the factual account of the
Genovese murder); see also generally Marcia M. Gallo, “No One Helped”: Kitty
Genovese, New York City, and the Myth of Urban Apathy (2015); Catherine
Pelonero, Kitty Genovese: A True Account of a Public Murder and Its Private
Consequences (2014); CHARLES E. SKOLLER, Twisted Confessions: The True
Story Behind The Kitty Genovese and Barbara Kralik Murder Trials (2008)
(account by the prosecutor in the Genovese case); Rachel Manning, Mark
Levine, Alan Collins, The Kitty Genovese Murder and the Social Psychology of
Helping: The Parable of the 38 Witnesses, 62 Am. Psychol. 555 (2007); Joseph
De May, Kitty Genovese: A critical review of the March 27, 1964
New York Times article that first broke the story, A Picture History of Kew Gardens,
NY, https://archive.is/39ZWT [https://perma.cc/SDC6-9GMU]; see also Harold
Takooshian, The 1964 Kitty Genovese Tragedy: Still a Valuable Parable,
PsychCritiques, Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books 54 (March
11, 2009) (reviewing Skoller, supra note 51 and Rosenthal, supra note 5). Many
thanks to Greg Klass for initial insights into the difference this history makes for
this analysis.
55
See Cook, supra note 46, 214-20.
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1. The Various Perspectives of the Genovese Witnesses
“For more than half an hour 38 respectable, law-abiding citizens in
Queens watched a killer stalk and stab a woman in three separate
attacks in Kew Gardens.”56 Abraham Rosenthal, editor of the New
York Times and the likely author of this first line, later admitted that he
knew this was impossible.57 Thirty-eight was the number of entries in
the police log of the people who were interviewed in the days
following the crime.58 Reporters never identified the witnesses, but
accepted the detective reports at face value.59 Instead, by the
prosecutor’s count, no more than five or six could have seen or heard
enough to know that Genovese was in mortal danger.60 Two of these
were kept off of the witness stand so as not to distract the jury from the
actions of the accused, Winston Moseley.61
What is made extremely opaque by the New York Times lead,
describing thirty-eight people who “watched” for “half an hour,” is
that two, not three, attacks took place in two different locations.62
Spatially and aurally it would have been impossible for the same group
of people to see or hear both.63 After the first attack, Moseley feared
that he might be identified by association with his car, which was
parked nearby.64 He left the scene to move the car.65 Genovese got up
and staggered around the corner, out of the sight and earshot of those
who may have seen the first attack from their windows.66 Because she
56
57

58
59
60
61
62
63

64
65
66

Gansberg, supra note 5.
See Cook, supra note 46, at 98 (quoting Rosenthal later admitting: “Thirty-eight
was impossible, I knew”).
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 107-09.
See id. at 127.
The first attack took place on Austin Street, and from the Mowbray apartment
building, several residents heard the ruckus on the street below. From the
seventh floor, Robert Mozer saw a man bent over a woman, striking her.
Assuming it was a domestic spat, not unusual just outside the pub, he lifted his
window and shouted, “Leave that girl alone!” After Moseley ran away, Mozer
watched Genovese stand up and walk around the corner out of sight. Then
Mozer went back to bed. See id.
Id. at 215.
Id.
Id. 215-16.
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had been stabbed in the lung, by the time she reached the second
location, an indoor entrance to an apartment, she did not have enough
lung capacity to emit an audible scream when Moseley returned.67
Of the seeming large number of witnesses, only two were likely to
have understood that she was in mortal danger and in need of
immediate help.68 Joseph Fink worked nights as an assistant
superintendent at the Mowbray apartment building.69 From an office
on the ground floor, he had a clear view of the scene of the first
attack.70 From fifty yards away, “he had watched a slender man in a
stocking cap plunge a knife into Kitty’s back. He remembered that the
knife blade was shiny.”71 The thought occurred to him that he could go
to retrieve a baseball bat from the basement, but in the end, he did
nothing and went downstairs and fell asleep.72
The other witness, Karl Ross, knew Genovese and was a frequent
guest in her home.73 He had been drinking most of the night, but at
3:30 a.m. he heard the cries from the initial Austin Street attack. 74 He
did nothing, and the cries died down.75 A few minutes later he was
startled by a noise coming from the back of his building. He heard
scuffling and a muffled cry.76 After a few minutes, he finally opened
the door a crack, and saw a man with a knife on top of Genovese.77
But he was too drunk and too scared, both of the attacker and of the
police, to make an immediate call from his own home: “he didn’t want
the cops knocking on his door.”78
67

68
69
70
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72
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76
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See id. at 111 (initial cries were loud, but during the second attack there were no
“full-throated screams” because “her punctured lungs could barely fill with
air.”); see also id. at 85 (describing the cause of death as bilateral
pneumothorax, in which air escapes from the lungs, fills the chest capacity, and
compresses the lungs).
Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 108-09.
Id. at 111.
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2. How Bystanders Did Help According to Their Capacities
According to the New York Times, it took half an hour after the
attack for anyone to call: it was “3:50 by the time the police received
their first call, from a man who was a neighbor of Miss Genovese. In
two minutes they were at the scene.”79 The Inspector lamented, “If we
had been called when he first attacked, [she] might not be dead.”80
But according to Kew Gardens historian Joseph De May, a key
witness was overlooked by reporters, police, and everyone else
involved in the investigation, one who did call immediately after the
first attack.81 Another neighbor, Andrée Picq, lived in the fourth floor
of the Mowbray.82 After she heard the initial screaming, she stayed at
her window, and saw the man come back, this time with a feathered
hat.83 She watched him check the doors of the train station, and then
lost sight of him.84 As Cook recounts, “Unsure of her English, unsure
of what she had just seen, afraid to identify herself to the authorities,
she put down the phone.”85 Finally, Sam Koshkin, from the sixth floor
of the Mowbray, wanted to phone the police, but his wife discouraged
him. “I told him there must have been thirty calls already.”86
79
80
81

82
83
84
85
86

See Gansberg, supra note 5; see also Cook, supra note 46, at 80.
See Gansberg, supra note 5; see also Cook, supra note 46, at 78.
See Cook, supra note 46, at 206-08 (noting that Michael Hoffman, who had seen
the attack from his window, and his father Sam were interviewed by the police
the day after the attack, and Michael recalled: “I remember my dad telling the
police that if they had come when we called, she’d probably still be alive. For
that he got a dirty look from the detective.”); De May, supra note 54.
See Cook, supra note 46, at 127.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161. What was termed by social psychologists as the “bystander effect”
was the subject of studies of staged emergency situations to measure whether
participants would intervene to help, and if so, the length of time that it took.
The studies demonstrated that the presence of other people often inhibits
helping, by a large margin. John Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander “Apathy,” 57
Am. Scientist 244-268 (1969); see also Cook supra note 43, at 166 (discussing
studies by Darley and Latané, suggesting “that situational factors may be of
greater importance. The failure to intervene may be better understood by
knowing the relationship among bystanders than that between a bystander and
the victim.”); see also, e.g., John Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander Intervention
in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 377383 (1968).
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The New York Times article gives the impression that the two
bystanders who did emerge were simply milling about the street at
four in the morning. “The neighbor, a 70-year old woman and another
woman were the only persons on the street. Nobody else came
forward.”87 In reality, in response to a round of calls set off by Ross’s
alert, Genovese’s friend Sophie Farrar rushed to the scene—and for all
she knew, to a murder in progress.88 When the police arrived, they
found Genovese cradled in Farrar’s arms; Farrar was saying, “It’s
okay, they’re coming. It won’t be long.”89
3. Subjective Perceptions of the Risks of Calling the Police
At the University of Chicago conference, general reference was
made to a certain mistrust of the police.90 As Gregory urged, “we must
get people to believe that the police will take them seriously and
respect their anonymity when they telephone.”91 Cook’s account
provides a much less sanitized version of the interactions at stake.
First, it is important to note that the New York Times story, which
appeared two weeks after the attack, finds its genesis in a lunch
between Times editor Abraham Rosenthal and police commissioner
Michael Murphy.92 One might extrapolate from these origins that it is
not surprising that a detail such as Sam Hoffman’s initial call to the
police might have slipped through the cracks of the investigative
reporting.
It is also important to note that at the time many New Yorkers
considered the police to be “bullies with guns.”93 To illustrate the
point, Cook catalogues a series of letters to the Times recounting the
police’s general lack of responsiveness to citizen complaints and
reports.94 But perhaps most important for this case is how a key
87
88
89
90
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Cook, supra note 46, at 80.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 220.
See also Gregory, supra note 50, at 33 (“Why did the thirty-eight people in Kew
Gardens, Queens, New York, behave as they did on the night of March 13,
1964? Because they were scared and did not want to get involved. Also because
they did not have faith in the police and did not want to stick their necks out.”).
Gregory, supra note 50, at 35.
Cook, supra note 46, at 96-97.
Id. at 126.
See id. at 126 (excerpting from letters to the New York Times: “Have you ever
reported anything to the police? If you did, you would know that you are
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bystander’s subjective perceptions of the police might have informed
and determined his failure to act. Ross’s fear of calling the police that
evening was probably in large part informed by the New York City
Police Department’s invasive and brutal treatment of gays and lesbians
at the time.95
Cook reports Ross was gay, and was friends with Kitty Genovese
and Mary Ann Zielonko, who were living together and in a lesbian
relationship. According to Cook, the negative treatment of
homosexuals by the police gave Ross good reason to fear calling
them.96 To give some idea of the treatment that Ross might have
expected from the police, it is interesting to note Zielonko’s
description of the reactions of their other gay friends to the
investigation: “My friends all stopped talking to me. They thought
they were being watched. They thought their phones were tapped.”97
Already before the exposure to the trauma of the murder, Ross was,
according to Zielonko, a “very nervous, frightened person.”98 Even in
the midst of an alcohol-induced stupor he may have intuited that a call
to the police might provoke an invasive police investigation, bringing
him beyond his threshold for anxiety and stress.99
What is the upshot of this more complex account of the
perspectives of the various witnesses to the Genovese murder? By my
lights, it seems that just about all of the neighbors did their best with
the information they had gleaned from what they were able to see and
hear at the time. If one factors in both subjective perspectives and
historical sensitivity to the relationship between the police and gay and
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subjected to insults and abuse from annoyed police such as ‘why don’t you
move out of the area?’ or ‘Why bother us?’ Or you will have a call answered
forty-five minutes after it was put in”; “Nothing annoys a precinct desk captain
more than a call after ten o’clock”; “I heard screaming on the street several
times, called the police, and was politely told to mind my own business.”; noting
that those who called the police “got quizzed. They want your name. Where you
live, why you’re calling . . . and all this time nothing is happening.”).
See generally id. at 15, 46-47 (recounting the violence and brutality of New
York City Vice Squad raids on gay and lesbian bars in the early 1960s).
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Zielonko herself was subject to an extremely invasive six-hour interrogation by
a Queen’s homicide detective as a prime suspect based on the assumption that
“homosexual romances produce more jealousy by far than ‘straight’ romances.
More jealousy means more chance for violence.” See id. at 83-84.
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lesbian individuals and communities in New York in the 1960s, it is
far from clear that Ross’s failure to call the police was indicative of
cruel indifference. This is not to negate that there may have been at
least one “moral monster” in the mix; Joseph Fink, who was an eyewitness from the first floor of the apartment building in front of the
crime scene fifty feet away, had watched Moseley plunge the blade
into Genovese’s back, and even remembered that the blade was shiny.
But then again, we do not have any further information that would
help to understand his subjective perspective and particular fears.
This is not to say that Ross did the right thing. Nor is it to say that
he should not have experienced pangs of conscience for having done
the wrong thing. Acknowledging the complexity of the subjective
interior life of bystanders—for example, how they perceive the risks of
interacting with authorities such as the police—would not preclude an
argument that bystanders should under some circumstances be held
morally responsible for their inaction.
From the outside, a witness such as Ross seems to have been
perfectly positioned to help. From the outside, nothing seems easier
than calling the police or shouting for help. But from what we might
intuit about the historical, circumstantial, social and psychological
factors in these cases, from inside the mind of Ross his emotionallycharged decision-making process was probably much more fraught.
Many hope that they could respond with heroic generosity to the
needs of others, but most people would admit that in the face of
danger, pressure, or other kinds of fear, they are just as likely to
experience paralysis, an instinct to flee, or at least to pull back from
engagement. Appreciation for the range of emotions and the reactive
nature of decisions to help (or not) also highlights that most people fall
somewhere in the middle of that vast range between devious villains
and super-heroes. A more complex account of the interior and
emotional life of people who encounter the trauma or urgent need of
others can help to ground our discussions of morality and law in a set
of more realistic expectations about human psychology and behavior.
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A DISTINCTION BETWEEN
“PURE BYSTANDERS” AND “ENGAGED SPECTATORS”
Holding steady these observations about the interior life of
bystanders, the analysis now moves to the project of delineating a
framework in which the decision-making process of a bystander is
accorded full respect, including respect for decisions made against the
backdrop of fears, emotional reactions, and psychological limitations.
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In considering which philosophical framework might help to
articulate these distinctions, this analysis considers both utilitarian and
deontological accounts of bystander obligations. Section A highlights
a few of the conceptual limitations of some utilitarian accounts of
bystander obligations. Section B explores some of the conceptual
strengths in selected aspects of Kantian ethics, including the broad
obligation to always treat humanity as an ends and never a means, as
well as the acknowledgment of the need for ample space to discern
what that duty might require in any given circumstance. On this basis,
Section C proposes drawing a clear distinction between the moral
obligations of bystanders who pass by or otherwise disengage from the
scene of an assault or accident (“pure bystanders”), and those who
choose to lock their attention on the scene (“engaged spectators”). 100

100

In the legal literature I have not found the term “engaged spectators” to be used
in precisely this way. For examples of an incidental use of the term, but not
referring to bystanders, see Louis D. Bilionis, Criminal Justice After the
Conservative Reformation, 94 Geo. L.J. 1347, 1355 (2006) (referring to courtwatchers as “engaged spectators”); Janet E. Lord and Michael Ashley Stein,
Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to Participate in Sport,
Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. Int’l L.J. 249, 264 (2009) (referring to spectators
to a sports event); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware
Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 127, 162 n.105 (1997) (discussing Posner’s
analogy between judges and spectators at a theatrical performance). In political
theory the term has been used to describe a stance of moral and political
critique. See, e.g., Aurelian Craiutu, Faces of Moderation: Raymond Aron as
Committed Observer, in Political Reason in the Age of Ideology (Essays in
Honor of Raymond Aron) 261, 273-75 (Bryan-Paul Forst and Daniel J.
Mahoney, eds., 2007) (examining Raymond Aron’s conception of political
moderation and use of the metaphor spectateur engagé, translated also as
“committed observer”). In art history and critique the term has been used to
describe the physical stance or cultural context of the viewer. See, e.g., John
Shearman, A More Engaged Spectator, in Only Connect . . . : Art and the
Spectator in the Italian Renaissance, at 10 (1992) (discussing the work of
Donatello, Tomb of Giovanni Pecci, Bishop of Grosseto, in the Duomo of Siena,
noting the perspective of an “engaged spectator”—one who is “placed in the
moment and position of witness at the bishop’s funeral.”); Nell Bouton Taylor,
The Engaged Spectator: Fifteenth-Century Venetian Textiles, their Function and
Acquired Meaning in Sacred Images (Master of Arts Thesis, George
Washington University) (2003) (discussing the use of space and the inclusion of
commercial commodities were meaningful to a Venetian audience).
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A. Conceptual Limits in Some Utilitarian Accounts of
Bystander Obligations
When considering a bystander’s encounter with a person in need of
emergency assistance, a frequent move in philosophical and legal
analysis is to begin weighing interests. For example, when weighing
the interests of a person whose life is at stake with the interests of a
bystander who is in a position to help without undue risk to oneself,
the calculus seems to point toward the circumstances dictating to the
bystander exactly what he or she should do or should have done. Why
resist that route?
It is interesting to note the parallels between the Seinfeld
prosecutor’s case discussed above101 and Jeremy Bentham’s classic
argument for the appropriateness of punishing a bystander’s failure to
help a person in need of assistance. Like the Seinfeld prosecutor,
Bentham queries: “[I]n cases where the person is in danger, why
should it not be the duty of every man to save another from mischief,
when it can be done without prejudicing himself, as well as to abstain
from bringing it on him?”102 In these circumstances, given the goal
that legislation and policy should produce the greatest good for the
greatest number of people, the gain in utility through saving a life
would certainly outweigh the slight cost to individual autonomy that
follows from legal compulsion to act.103 Given the presumption that
the risk and imposition would be minimal, and the obvious disparity
between the value of the life of the victim and the inconvenience of the
one in a position to assist, Bentham’s examples focus on the optimal
positioning of the bystander to give immediate assistance:
A woman’s head-dress catches fire: water is at hand: a
man, instead of assisting to quench the fire, looks on,
and laughs at it. A drunken man, falling with his face
downwards into a puddle, is in danger of suffocation:
101
102

103

See discussion supra at note 12.
Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 29293 (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart, eds., 1970) (1789); see Jeremy Bentham, Specimen
of a Penal Code, in 1 Works of Jeremy Bentham 164 (J. Bowring, ed. 1943)
(“Every man is bound to assist those who have need of assistance, if he can do it
without exposing himself to sensible inconvenience.”).
See Ernest Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale L.J. 247, 265-66
(1980) (describing but not adopting a utilitarian line; deontological support
subsequently retracted by further scholarship).
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lifting his head a little on one side would save him:
another man sees this and lets him lie. A quantity of
gunpowder lies scattered about a room: a man is going
into it with a lighted candle: another, knowing this, lets
him go in without warning.104
Bentham concludes with a rhetorical question: “Who is there that
in any of these cases would think punishment misapplied?”105
There is another parallel between Bentham’s example and the
Seinfeld Finale. Considering Bentham’s illustration of the woman with
the headdress on fire, what drives this intuition that punishment would
be appropriate? Not only does the man look on, but he also laughs at
her predicament. Other interactions are more ambiguous. For example,
all we know about the bystander to the drunken man with his face in
the puddle is that he “sees” him; we have no further information about
the surrounding circumstances, and what else might be going on in the
man’s mind that might have informed his decision not to intervene.
Similarly, the decision-making process of the person observing the
man with the candle entering the room with gunpowder remains
opaque; we know only that he has observed the other man entering.
When one considers in depth the subjective perspective of a
bystander, even the seemingly easy examples—e.g., lifting the face of
a drunken man out of a puddle—pose difficult questions. What if the
seemingly drunk man is lying in a dark alley, and I am alone? What if
he is faking it and has a knife or gun? Or what if that scenario is
unlikely as an objective matter, but subjectively I struggle with this
fear because I am paranoid? What if that particular alley is for me an
emotional trigger that could provoke a panic attack because I was
assaulted there last summer? What if I am concerned that he might
have a communicable disease and I do not have gloves? And I am a
hypochondriac? What if I am late for work as a nurse in the emergency
room, and on this particular day, I know that we are short-staffed, such
that even a few minutes further delay could have a serious impact on
someone else’s health?106
104

105
106

See Bentham, Introduction, supra note 102, at 292-93 (note also that in
subsequent rescue discussions Bentham’s examples are occasionally confused
with actual cases).
Id.
See, e.g., John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A
Study in Dispositional and Situational Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J.

2017

Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification

95

Especially as the cases become harder, more violent, and perhaps
include strong elements of fear and anxiety, how is one to measure the
lengths to which a bystander should go? Should internal anxiety be
measured by a subjective or objective standard? Both the Seinfeld
statute articulating a duty to aid “when it is reasonable to do so,” and
Bentham’s rule that the duty to “save another from mischief” would
apply “when it can be done without prejudicing himself,” leave open a
host of serious and difficult questions. Further, the framework of
“weighing interests” seems insufficient for the work of understanding
how to grapple with these questions.
Consider, for example, the difficulty of assessing the response of
Kitty Genovese’s neighbor Ross in response to the attack on
Genovese. Once it is clear that the case is not “easy,” it is difficult to
begin drawing lines—was it enough to call a neighbor instead of the
police? How should one measure the counterweight of Ross’s
particular fear of an invasive police investigation? How might one
account for impairment of judgment due to alcohol? The large number
of variables required for a strict utilitarian analysis leaves much to
purportedly objective but ultimately arbitrary assessments.
Notwithstanding the appeal of the “greater good for the greater
number,” few people are truly comfortable with the idea of an
unbounded duty to the point of self-sacrifice. As Liam Murphy
explains, the core of the problem with the utilitarian argument is the
concern about demands without limits. While utilitarian ideas may be
attractive in theory, most people would not live by such extremely
demanding criteria.107
For Murphy this presents a major obstacle in the application of
utilitarian theory. He explains: “We cannot breezily evaluate legal
institutions such as tort law or the criminal law with the utilitarian
criterion without thinking about the implications of that criterion in the
realm of personal conduct.”108 As Murphy surmises:

107
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Personality & Soc. Psych. 100, 108 (1973) (noting how the elements of “hurry”
and conflicting commitments may influence a decision to help or not).
See Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required
Rescue, 89 Geo. L. J. 605, 644, 646 (2001); see also Judith Lichtenberg,
Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the “New Harms,” 120 Ethics 557, 557
(2010) (in light of the “over-demandingness” objection to positive duties,
offering a theory of responsibility in light of the subtle nature of “New Harms”).
Id. at 647.
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If commitment to a duty to rescue brings with it a
commitment to a general moral requirement of
beneficence, and if the most straightforward general
requirement of beneficence is the optimizing
requirement of the utilitarians, it would seem that the
commitment to legal duties to rescue comes at the price
of embracing the allegedly absurd demands of that
requirement.109
This objection was at the core of the seminal bystander analysis of
Lord Macaulay, who illustrated his concerns with the question of
whether a surgeon who was the only person who could perform a lifesaving operation could be forced to travel some distance to do so.110
Lord Macaulay remarked:
It is true that the man who, having abundance of
wealth, suffers a fellow creature to die of hunger at his
feet, is a bad man—a worse man, probably, than many
of those for whom we have provided very severe
punishment. But we are unable to see where, if we make
such a man legally punishable, we can draw the line. If
the rich man who refuses to save the beggar’s life at the
cost of a little copper is a murderer, is the poor man
just one degree above beggary also to be a murderer if
he omits to invite the beggar to partake his hard earned
rice? Again: If the rich man is a murderer for refusing
to save the beggar’s life at the cost of a little copper, is
he also to be a murderer if he refuses to save the
beggar’s life at the cost of a thousand rupees?111
When slightly more complex elements enter the scene such as
violence, fear and anxiety, some lines of utilitarian reasoning run up
against serious limitations. Not only do they risk vague and unbounded
109
110
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Murphy, supra note 107, at 650.
Thomas B. Macaulay, Notes on the Indian Penal Code, in 4 Miscellaneous
Works of Lord Macaulay 252-53 (H. Trevelyn ed., 1880); see also Michael
Menlowe, The Philosophical Foundations of a Duty to Rescue, in The Duty to
Rescue: Jurisprudence of Aid 18 (Michael Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith
eds. 1993).
Macaulay, supra note 110, at 254-55; see also Jeremy Waldron, On the Road:
Good Samaritans and Compelling Duties , 40 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1053, 1079
n.45 (2000).
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application, they also risk missing the deeper story of what exactly
hangs in the balance, in large part, because they lack more fine-tuned
instruments that might help to account for more subjective factors.
B. Conceptual Strengths in Some Elements of Kantian
Thought
In contrast to the limits discussed above, certain elements of
Immanuel Kant’s thought may help to provide elements for a more
complex assessment of the moral and legal obligations that may arise
when a bystander encounters a person in need of emergency
assistance. In particular, this section explores the extent to which
selected concepts from Kant can form a framework that is
simultaneously able to hold together affirmation of the principle of
respect for the humanity of the victim, psychic space for the bystander
to exercise discretion based on the specific circumstances, and an
appreciation for just how emotionally charged these encounters may
be.
Applying Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect
obligations, as well as further explanation of wide and narrow duties,
to an analysis of bystander response to a person in need of emergency
assistance, an important distinction may be drawn. This distinction
separates the maxims that a subject is required to hold from the process
of discernment to decide what to do in a given situation.112 For
example, returning to the scene of the Genovese murder, Ross would
have undoubtedly had the duty to hold the maxim that a person should
do all he could to help another person in Genovese’s situation. But did
he, Ross, necessarily have the particular duty to call the police in that
specific circumstance? I argue that Kant would not make that move.
The discussion below fleshes out this claim.
In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant depicts the
man for whom things are going well who refuses to help others whom
he could help:
112

See Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 6:411 (Mary Gregor trans.,
1991) [hereinafter Kant, Metaphysics] (“. . . the doctrine of Right has to do only
with narrow duties, where ethics has to do with wide duties . . . But ethics,
because of the latitude it allows in its imperfect duties, inevitably leads to
questions that call upon judgment to decide how a maxim is to be applied in
particular cases, and indeed in such a way that judgment provides another
(subordinate) maxim (and one can always ask for yet another principle in
applying this maxim to cases that may arise.). So ethics fall into a casuistry,
which has no place in the doctrine of Right.”).
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“[He thinks]: what’s it to me? May everyone be as
happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself, I
shall take nothing away from him, not even envy him; I
just do not feel like contributing anything to his wellbeing, or his assistance in need!’ . . . But even though it
is possible that a universal law of nature could very
well subsist according to that maxim, it is still
impossible to will that such a principle hold everywhere
as a law of nature. For a will that resolved upon this
would conflict with itself, as many cases can yet come
to pass in which one needs the love and compassion of
others, and in which by such a law of nature spring
from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope and
the assistance he wishes for himself.113
Or as expressed in the Formula of Universal Law: “Act only
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law.”114
As described in the Groundwork, the duties are not minimalist. For
example, with regard to the duty to oneself, “it is not enough that the
action not conflict with humanity in our person as an end in itself; it
must also harmonize with it.”115 Neglecting the predisposition to
greater perfection might “admittedly be consistent with the
preservation of humanity, as an end in itself, but not with the
furtherance of this end.”116 Similarly, duties to others cannot be
reduced to not “intentionally detracting” from the happiness of
others—because such would be only a “negative and not a positive
agreement with humanity, as an end in itself” unless everyone also

113
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Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals [hereinafter Kant,
Groundwork] (Mary Gregor trans., revised ed. 2012) at Ak. 4:423. See also
Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 109 at Ak. 6:393 (“The reason that it is
a duty to be beneficent is thus: Since our self-love cannot be separated from our
need to be loved (helped in case of need) by others as well, we therefore make
ourselves an end for others; and the only way this maxim can be binding is
through its qualification as a universal law, hence through our will to make
others our ends as well. The happiness of others is therefore an end that is also a
duty.”).
Kant, Groundwork, supra note 112, at Ak. 4:421.
Id. at Ak. 4:430.
Id.
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tries, as far as he can, “to further the ends of others.”117 As Kant
summarizes: “For the ends of a subject who is an end in itself must, as
far as possible, be also my ends, if that representation is to have its full
effect in me.”118
That sounds pretty demanding. But in the Metaphysics of Morals,
Kant clearly explains that setting maxims is only half of the project.
His analysis also draws an important distinction between setting
maxims and the process of discernment for deciding how one is to act
in particular circumstances.
If the law can prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions
themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a latitude (latitudine) for free
choice in following (complying with) the law, that is, that the law
cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one
is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty. But a wide duty is
not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of
actions, but only as permission to limit one maxim of duty by another
(e.g., love of one’s neighbor in general by love of one’s parents), by
which in fact the field for the practice of virtue is widened.119
In the Metaphysics of Morals, this explanation is followed by a
number of examples that flesh out the shape of Kant’s space for
discretion. For example, when considering the question of choosing an
occupation, one has a clear duty to cultivate one’s own talents, but the
variety of circumstances in which people find themselves leave wide
latitude for discretion: “No rational principle prescribes specifically
how far one should go in cultivating one’s capacities.”120 Similarly, for
the cultivation of morality, the duty prescribes “only the maxim of the
action, that of seeing the basis of obligation solely in the law and not
in sensible impulse (advantage or disadvantage), and hence not the
action itself.”121
At this juncture, Kant’s system evinces a profound respect for the
interior life, and the fact that human beings remain mysteries even to
themselves: “For a man cannot see into the depth of his own heart so
as to be quite certain, in even a single action, of the purity of his moral
intention and the sincerity of his disposition, even when he has no
117
118
119
120
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Id.
Id.
Kant, Metaphysics, supra note 110, at Ak. 6:390.
Id. at Ak. 6:392.
Id.
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doubts about the legality of his action.”122 Also for this reason it is
especially difficult to prescribe particular actions for particular
circumstances.
Most directly related to the question of bystander assistance, Kant
explains both the impossibility of determining the extent to which one
should sacrifice one’s own needs, and the potential for a conflict
between the maxim of care for one’s own true needs, and that of care
for the happiness of others.
But I ought to sacrifice a part of my welfare to others without hope
of return because this is a duty, and it is impossible to assign specific
limits to the extent of this sacrifice. How far it should extend depends,
in large part, on what each person’s true needs are in view of his
sensibilities, and it must be left to each to decide this for himself. For a
maxim of promoting others’ happiness at the sacrifice of one’s own
happiness, one’s true needs, would conflict with itself if it were made a
universal law. Hence this duty is only a wide one; the duty has in it a
latitude for doing more or less, and no specific limits can be assigned
to what should be done. The law holds only for maxims, not for
specific actions.123
The exercise of judgment, therefore, is inevitable—both in
determining which maxim should apply to a particular case, and
exactly how that maxim should be applied.124
In the exercise of determining exactly what to do, as Nancy
Sherman notes, emotions can actually help in the process: “in a fallible
122
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Id.; see also id. at Ak. 6:446-47 (discussing how duties are narrow and perfect in
terms of quality; “but it is wide and imperfect in terms of its degree, because of
the frailty of human nature. . . . The depths of the human heart are unfathomable.
Who knows himself well enough to say, when he feels the incentive to fulfill his
duty whether it proceeds entirely from the representation of the law or whether
there are not many other sensible impulses contributing to it that look to one’s
advantage (or to avoiding what is detrimental) and that, in other circumstances,
could just as well serve vice?”).
Id. at Ak. 6:393.
See id. at Ak. 6:411 (“[E]thics, because of the latitude it allows in its imperfect
duties, inevitably leads to questions that call upon judgment to decide how a
maxim is to be applied in particular cases, and indeed in such a way that
judgment provides another (subordinate) maxim (and one can always ask for yet
another principle in applying this maxim to cases that may arise).”); see also
Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Moral Community: Escaping the Ethical State of Nature, 9
Philosopher’s Imprint 14 (August 2009) (discussing the “playroom” and
indeterminacy of wide duties).
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way, they may give some access to values and concerns that might
otherwise remain veiled from one’s reports about what motivates one’s
action.”125 Further, much of the work of deliberation is not projecting
out toward the abstract dimension of a universalizable maxim, but
“reflecting on what respect for rational agency requires of us in the
circumstances before us.”126 Sherman explains:
On this view of deliberation, the Categorical Imperative
functions not as a formal universalization procedure
but, rather, as a more substantive norm prescribing
positive and negative respect for rational agents
generally, and more specifically, through specific
norms such as nondeception or beneficence. The norms
are supple in that they stand ready to be transformed
and thickened by the circumstances themselves.127
A final element of Kant’s analysis to consider is the interaction
with what he describes as “subjective conditions of the receptiveness
to the concept of duty, not as objective conditions of morality.”128 His
examples include moral feeling, conscience, love of neighbor, and
respect for self. These are “moral endowments”—gifts—which means
that “anyone lacking them could have no duty to acquire them.”129 The
same applies to “sympathetic joy and sadness”—“sensible feelings of
pleasure or pain at another’s state of joy or sorrow.”130
For the mere susceptibility, given by nature itself, to feel joy and
sadness in common with others, there is no imperfect duty. In contrast,
the capacity and the will to share in other’s feelings are based on
practical reason, thus one can parse out an indirect duty to “share in
the fate” of others, cultivating “the compassionate natural feelings in
us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on
moral principles and the feelings appropriate to them.” Specific
examples include not avoiding the poor, the sick, and debtors with the
excuse of avoiding sharing painful feelings, but rather to seek these
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Nancy Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue 304 (1997).
Id. at 310.
Id. at 312.
Kant, Metaphysics, supra note 112, at Ak. 6:399.
Id.
Id. at Ak. 6:456.
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people out.”131 In other words, feelings and emotions are not always in
our control, and within Kant’s framework there is no specific duty to
feel a certain way—even to feel compassion.
On the other hand, this can be distinguished from the cultivation of
an attitude of callous indifference to others and to their needs.
According to Karen Stohr, Kant’s ethical framework would
contemplate a narrow duty to avoid this. She parses beneficence as a
two-part duty, embracing not only “the familiar obligation to adopt the
wide maxim of helping others on occasion,” but also “a narrow duty
parallel to the narrow duties of respect, which prohibit contempt,
arrogance, defamation, and mockery.”132 For example, to mock
someone, treating her as a mere means to the end of the entertainment
of my friends, is to fail to acknowledge the other person’s status “as an
end in the negative sense.”133 Stohr proposes that “we interpret
beneficence as implying a narrow duty to avoid indifference to others
as ends in the positive sense or as setters of ends.”134 Helping actions,
therefore, would be obligatory in circumstances in which “helping is
the only way to acknowledge the other person’s status as a positive
end,”135 “although we are not always required to help, we are always
required not to be indifferent. When helping someone is the only way
not to be indifferent to her, we are required to help.”136
What might Kant make of Karl Ross’s decision not to call the
police but to call a neighbor instead? Note that Ross did not neglect to
engage in some helping action—calling a neighbor. The circumstances
presented numerous ways for him to act on his obligation not to be
indifferent, and in this way, to express as he was able respect for
humanity present in Genovese.
Further, as Kant explains, “Imperfect duties are, accordingly, only
duties of virtue. Fulfillment of them is merit; but failure to fulfill them
is not in itself culpability. But rather a mere deficiency in moral worth,
unless the subject should make it his principle not to comply with such

131
132

133
134
135
136

Id. at Ak. 6:457.
Karen Stohr, Kantian Beneficence and the Problem of Obligatory Aid, 8 J.
Moral Phil. 45, 61 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63.

2017

Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification

103

duties.”137 If Ross did fall short of his moral obligations, then from the
further details in Cook’s account it seems that it might have been more
due to weakness, want of virtue or lack of moral strength, rather than
an intentional transgression which reflected a principle, and thus
vice.138 The elements of Kantian ethics noted above would have
accorded him the latitude to discern what he was able to do in light of
his emotional state in these specific circumstances, and then act
accordingly. It could very well be that in calling the neighbor he did all
he could have done under the circumstances, and as evaluated from the
complexity of his subjective perspective.
C. Distinctions between the Moral Obligations of “Pure
Bystanders” and “Engaged Spectators”
What are the implications of these Kantian concepts for an analysis
for the moral obligations of bystanders in varying circumstances? As
discussed above, this Article proposes an analytical distinction
between an “engaged spectator” and a “pure bystander”—a person
who may notice something about the incident, but who does not stop
to focus on it. When considering the moral obligations of persons in
these categories, the first issue to address is whether bystanders who,
for various reasons, do not stop or focus on the incident and the
victim’s need for assistance should really get off scot-free. It seems
odd to treat more favorably a kind of passive and perhaps even
cowardly non-engagement.
Here it is important to note that to acknowledge the respect
inherent in a Kantian space for discretion for a bystander to decide
whether and/or how to engage a victim in need of emergency
assistance is not equivalent to letting a bystander off scot-free. It is
simply to acknowledge that, for example, it is very difficult to tell
whether the decision not to directly intervene in that moment was the
best that Karl Ross could manage under the circumstances.
For this reason, I believe it would be difficult for the law to draw
any hard lines regarding civil legal responsibility dependent on a risk
and injury that the bystander did not cause and/or did not exacerbate.
Notwithstanding his proximity to the violence, Karl Ross was a “pure
bystander.” The concepts from Kantian ethical analysis discussed
above can help to hold together respect for the needs of victims, and
137
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respect for the discretionary space that bystanders require to decide
whether to engage a particular scene and what to do in particular
circumstances, without neglecting the gamut of circumstantial and
emotional factors that might influence a person’s encounter with a
vulnerable person in need of emergency assistance.
At what point though, would a narrow duty that prohibits
“contempt, arrogance, defamation, and mockery” be triggered for a
bystander?139 In what circumstances might an interaction between a
bystander and a vulnerable person become a failure to treat that person
as an end in himself, and as a positive setter of his own ends? In other
words, when does a bystander cross the line, moving out of the pure
bystander’s discretionary space into the category of an “engaged
spectator”?
One potential distinguishing mark may be the use of technology
such as a cell phone. Cell phone technology and its analogies generally
require one to stop and focus, therefore, to directly engage a person
who is in a vulnerable state. The decision to stop and focus is itself an
exercise of discretion which has led to a form of direct contact with
another human being. Distinctions in the moral analysis follow not
from a preference for passive disengagement, but from a recognition
that this kind of contact between a bystander and a victim calls for a
separate analysis.
In his analysis of bystander obligations, Jeremy Waldron
highlights the importance of proximity and the nature of a more direct
and focused encounter with a victim in a vulnerable state. At the
outset, he recognizes that the categories of proximity and distance
raise a number of important moral questions:
Do moral concerns and requirements diminish over
distance, so that our duties are stronger to those who
are near to us, and weaken to vanishing point as
possible beneficiaries of our actions and inactions are
found further and further away? And what does
“distance” mean in these circumstances? When is a
person near to me? When is a person far away? Is it a
matter of who they are, and of their relation to me? Or
is it sheer geography?140
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See Karen Stohr’s discussion of this narrow duty, supra note 129.
Jeremy Waldron, Who is My Neighbor?: Humanity and Proximity, 86 Monist
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No one needs to answer all of these questions to discern that
particular duties and harms may emerge on the basis of physical
proximity. In his interpretation of the Good Samaritan parable,
Waldron urges that we resist the temptation to reduce the message to a
fairly straightforward form of moral universalism in which “we owe a
duty of neighborly love to each and every person on the face of the
earth in virtue of their simple humanity.”141 Waldron argues:
So is it wrong to see the “moral” of the parable as
prescribing nothing but a diffuse and universal
concern? It is not altogether at odds with that, but what
it prescribes—and the reason it hangs onto the idea of
‘neighbor’—is openness and responsiveness to actual
human need in whatever form it confronts us.142
For Waldron, focus on the victim’s predicament is an important
threshold. Always in the context of an argument for an obligation to
rescue, he explains:
In almost all situations where rescue might plausibly be
required by morality (or for that matter by law), all the
agents concerned—potential helpers and potential
victims—are likely to have their attention focused on
the victim’s predicament, and they have to make a
serious effort of will to shift from that orientation to
going about their ordinary business with no thought of
the victim’s plight.143
Thus, for Waldron, there is something “morally special” about
being “on the spot”—in the narrative of the Good Samaritan, where
the man had fallen among thieves, and as distinguished from broad and
141
142

143

Id. at 338.
Id. at 343 (emphasis added). Waldron also articulates the moral shortcomings of
the bystanders in the Good Samaritan parable for having crossed to the other
side of road. He makes much of their intentional and deliberate choice, “going
out of their way not to help, or going out of their way to avoid a decision about
whether to help.” See id. at 343. My distinction between “pure bystanders” and
“engaged spectators” would not foreclose moral responsibility or blame; but I
would be more cautious about the capacity to discern an intentional moral harm
from the mere action of crossing the road. See also Waldron, supra note 111, at
1081.
Id. at 344; see also Waldron, supra note 111, at 1081.
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universal general obligations.144 In sum, to focus more sharply on the
obligations of engaged spectators is not to make a definitive statement
about the moral obligations of pure bystanders, but only to submit that
the circumstances require different categories for analysis.
What about the category of spectators who stop and engage the
scene, aware of the victim’s vulnerability and immediate need, and
then simply watch, doing nothing to help—but that watching just
happens not to be mediated by recording technology? The blurred line
that this fact pattern indicates illustrates that the moral evaluation of a
bystander’s interaction with the victim in an emergency context does
not hinge on the use of the technology in and of itself. Rather it hinges
on what that use signifies about both the complex circumstances and
the interior life and decision-making process of the engaged spectator.
What does it signify? That question, together with the question of
moral evaluation, involves interpretation as well as openness to other
factors that may change the narrative of meaning in substantial ways.
What does it mean to take a cell phone picture of an ongoing assault
on a victim? Obviously, it need not necessarily be indicative of intent
to harm the victim’s dignity. In the Robles incident, we should
entertain at least the possibility that someone in the crowd was taking
pictures with the intent to help the victim and the community—
perhaps on the assumption that someone had already called for help;
and perhaps with the idea of turning them over to a police
investigation, in order to find or confirm the identity of the
perpetrator.145 Perhaps it was filmed as a record of what happened, or
perhaps there were many motives behind the recording.
Thus I do not submit that a person who snaps a cell phone picture
in circumstances such as the Robles assault is automatically subject to
moral condemnation. Nor will I argue that a cell phone necessarily
makes all the difference. The moral significance of taking a picture of
an assault victim can vary greatly, depending on one’s intent. As noted
above, on the far end of the spectrum (moving from good to bad to
worse), one might have thought that someone else had already called
144

145

Waldron, supra note 140, at 346; cf. Barbara Armacost, Affirmative Duties,
Systemic Harms, and the Due Process Clause, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 982, 998, 1022,
1026 (1996) (noting patterns in which a government special relationship
exception is theorized for incidents when emergency workers are “on the
scene”; surmising that these claims do not necessarily require courts to probe
larger questions of resource allocation).
See Burke et al., supra note 17.
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for help, and the greatest service that one could provide for the victim
and for the safety of the community was to record the event in order to
assist with the future police investigation. Slightly more ambiguous,
perhaps the intent was to mark in some way—to witness, to
acknowledge—the reality of violence in the community, as part of
one’s own effort to help heal these maladies when possible. For
example, a university professor of sociology may have planned to
show the picture to his or her class as part of a discussion aimed at
understanding the challenges of urban violence. Or to introduce a
further layer, one may have intended to take a picture of people taking
pictures, as part of a critique of this phenomenon.
Picture-taking may also have been an almost automatic, mindless
act, one more sight or sound to take in on the way to work, together
with a bagel and morning coffee, and an indication of being on autopilot, not intending to harm the victim, not intending anything, really.
If we take seriously the interior life of bystanders, what happens when
we find in that interiority neither good purpose nor malice, nor any
intent to harm, but simply a mindless reaction?
Further down the spectrum, how do we account for the portion of
the population for whom taking a picture of someone who is suffering
provokes an addictive pleasure, and for whom continued private
viewing of the pictures might be a further source of pleasure? Or
worse, one’s intent may have been to post the pictures to a Facebook
account, accompanied by sneeringly brutal remarks that aimed to bully
and shame the victim—perhaps, like in the Seinfeld Finale,146 even
alluding to his ethnicity, his weight, or other personal characteristics
that could work to continue the assault on his person and his integrity.
Or motives may have been mixed and shifting—perhaps starting to
record as a somewhat mindless reaction, becoming horrified by the
violence, and then ending up with resolve to share the pictures with the
police. Or vice-versa—starting out with resolve to go to the police, but
worries of somehow becoming more involved in an investigation, and
questions about one’s own role as a witness prevents one from doing
so. With the realization of having done nothing to help, one may also
feel ashamed, as to delete the pictures as part of an attempt to delete
the incident from one’s mind and heart. Or one may simply forget
about the incident if for some reason it did not really engrave itself
into one’s psyche, but rather it was received as a fairly banal and
146

See Finale Script, supra note 6.
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trivial incident that blends into other weird sights that one takes in
during the morning commute.
In light of this complexity, the moral analysis could go something
like this: generally, bystanders should be allotted wide discretion in
making the decision of whether or not to engage the scene of a violent
or life-threatening emergency. Such is not to condone callous
indifference, but simply to acknowledge the subjective nature of the
decision and the difficulty of defining bright-line rules for
engagement. Use of technology, such as taking a cell phone picture, is
one indication that the bystander has crossed the line—becoming, so to
say, an “engaged spectator”—directly engaging not only the scene of
an accident or an assault, but also in some way the vulnerable person.
However they engage, those who do stop are then morally obliged
to treat the victim as an end in himself or herself—not as a thing or an
object, but as a human being. Cell phones may be used to do just that:
calling for help and recording the attack for a subsequent police
investigation are both potentially signs of respect for the humanity of
the victim. Cell phones may also be used as instruments of harm: to
objectify, humiliate and exploit a victim at his or her most vulnerable
moment. Those who decide to stop, focus and engage an emergency
scene, and to use their cell phones to record images of a victim at the
site of an assault or an accident, have a moral obligation to treat the
victim with dignity, which includes neither objectifying nor exploiting
their vulnerability.147
V. THE TORT OBLIGATIONS OF “ENGAGED SPECTATORS”
In the 1960s, the Kitty Genovese story sparked a national debate
on the “bystander effect,” and whether there should be a legal duty to
assist or at least call for help in an emergency situation when there are
supposedly numerous witnesses.148 Should the whole neighborhood
147

148

Because of limited space, this Article will fully delineate neither the nature of
the duty between otherwise-strangers, nor the nature of the harm, nor the extent
to which the category of “engaged spectators” may overlap with
photojournalists. Each of these topics has been the subject of my doctoral
research, and will be the subject of future publications.
See Cook, supra note 46 (discussing studies by Latané and Darley suggesting
“that situational factors may be of greater importance. The failure to intervene
may be better understood by knowing the relationship among bystanders than
that between a bystander and the victim.”); see also, e.g., John Darley & Bibb
Latané, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J.

2017

Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification

109

have been held responsible? How can one pick out from a crowd the
individuals who were actually paying attention and focused, and thus
could have helped in some way? How can one pick out from a crowd
who should have been able to discern—at a distance, through a closed
window—the difference between the shouts of a lover’s spat and the
scream from an attack? At what point in time would everyone have
been off the hook since one person actually did call the police? The
Genovese case indicates the complexity of a rush to judgment against
numerous “pure” bystanders.
Consider how interactions between bystanders and victims have
changed with the advent of cell phone technology. First, in many
instances, at least for a certain set of bystanders, it is no longer a
question of guessing who might have been paying attention. Breaking
down the anatomy of a bystander on the street taking a cell phone
picture or video: the act usually includes stopping and focusing—
psychologically on the event; visually in order to capture the image;
and technologically, while engaging the media of the recording
technology. The action also leaves a time and date-stamped recorded
image, which is also some evidence of one’s visual perspective on the
event. Captured in digital memory are data that also indicate elements
such as lighting, proximity, and view. Finally, as mentioned above, a
cell phone picture is also usually evidence of having in hand the
requisite technology not only to take a picture, but also to call for help.
In other words, the act of taking a cell phone picture without using the
same instrument to dial an emergency number may also reveal a
choice—to take a picture rather than to call for help.
In contrast to the time of the Genovese murder, in the Robles case,
we now have a potential record not only of who among the bystanders
saw what and when, but also of their potentially deliberate decision to
treat the incident as a show rather than a traumatic human emergency
which would have required direct assistance or a call for help.
The act of taking a cell phone picture can function as a kind of
sorting mechanism, to separate “pure bystanders”—those who do not
engage the scene of an accident or assault—from “engaged
spectators,” those who do engage and focus the scene, and who decide
not to call for help, notwithstanding that fact that they have the means
to do so literally in their hands. This Part focuses on the legal
Personality & Soc. Psych. 377 (1968); John Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander
“Apathy,” 57 Am. Scientist 244 (1969).
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obligations of bystanders who decided to engage—or to use John
Adler’s turn of the phrase—to “venture forth” to encounter the scene
of a crime or accident, and in so doing, to both objectify and exploit a
person in need of emergency assistance.149
Daily life in our society presents a number of scenarios in which
people objectify and exploit each other in some way. An attempt to
impose tort liability on many of these various harms would be
unrealistic and undesirable for many reasons. For this reason, the
proposed tort of “exploitative objectification of a person in need of
emergency assistance” includes a number of necessary features that
aim to capture the circumstances in which the coercive force of tort
law, an exercise of state power, could step in. The sections below
parse these elements.150
A. The Victim is a Vulnerable Person
In what circumstances might standing on a public sidewalk taking
a picture of someone constitute a legally cognizable harm under the
common law of torts? The short answer is: not very many. To draw a
contrast, the proposed new tort would not encompass taking pictures
of people in their bathing suits at the beach. Although this form of
potential objectification may also be problematic and morally wrong,
for the purposes of this tort analysis, there is an important difference
between a person who suits up or strips down in order to relax or play
at the beach and an injured victim of an assault or accident who finds
him or herself exposed because of an assault or accident. In a way that
the beachgoer is not, the victim of an assault or accident is
vulnerable—understood as “open to physical or emotional harm”—

149

150

See John Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some
Observations about the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid
or Protect Others, 1991 Wisc. L. Rev. 867, 916 (1991) (“One may always
confine one’s activities completely so as to try to avoid the risk of accidental
occurrences. When individuals venture forth and encounter accidents, however,
liability rules require that they behave reasonably.”).
I would like to express gratitude to the Georgetown Law faculty members who
participated in the April 2015 workshop discussion of this aspect of the analysis,
and also to Deborah Cantrell and Sheila Foster who took the time for extended
conversations on this topic. The questions raised and suggestions offered in
these contexts were an important source of insight and clarity for this portion of
the analysis.

2017

Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification

111

and generally has no control over the circumstances that brought him
or her to be splayed out for public visual consumption.151
At the heart of exploitative objectification in these circumstances is
not so much the image capture itself, but a power dynamic in which
one who is in control of his or her faculties preys on a person in a
vulnerable state who is not. It is this interaction between power and
helplessness that generates the problematic nature of the encounter,
and that constitutes a specific kind of harm. Photography of both
subjects (the person in a bathing suit at a public beach, and the victim
in need of emergency assistance) without consent may result in
exploitative objectification, and both scenarios may be not only
distasteful but disturbing. However, I would argue, only the latter
crosses the line into the kind of harm that should be legally cognizable
under the rubric of this proposed new tort.
B. The Objective Need for Emergency Assistance
Although we live in a world filled with immense need, very few
people would actually sign up for a life program of unbounded duties
of self-sacrifice.152 There is, however, something extremely
problematic about venturing forth to encounter a particular person in
urgent need of assistance, and then doing nothing to help this person.
151

152

See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference—The Restrained
State, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 609, 614 (2015). Martha Fineman’s work indicates how
legal theory might be informed by an understanding of vulnerability deeper and
broader than this working definition. See id. (“Often narrowly understood as
merely ‘openness to physical or emotional harm,’ vulnerability should be
recognized as the primal human condition. As embodied beings, we are
universally and individually constantly susceptible to harm, whether caused by
infancy and lack of capacity, disease and physical decline, or by natural or
manufactured disasters. This form of dependency, although episodic, is
universally experienced and could be thought of as the physical manifestation or
realization of our shared vulnerability as human persons, which is constant
throughout the life course.”). I believe that the narrower meaning—openness to
physical or emotional harm—is sufficient for this particular application; but
such would certainly not exclude deeper theorization on the comparative
advantages of vulnerability over equality in other contexts as well. See also id.
at 618-19 (distinguishing between the vulnerability that arises because we are
embodied beings and that which arises embedded in social relationships);
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State,
60 Emory L.J. 251, 267 (2010) (describing the pervasive nature of vulnerability,
and variety of forms in which it arises from embodiment).
See discussion and sources cited supra note 107.
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One way to imagine this is as an extreme form of a tease, but the
circumstances of urgent need make it not only not funny, but cruel.
How might the concept of “urgent need” help to ground the tort?
First, the category of the need for emergency assistance works to
ground the harm in an objective source. Harms that run parallel to
claims for emotional distress are likely to be met with the skeptical
assessment that the law should not cater to the feelings of those who
are super-sensitive to every slight. As John Goldberg and Benjamin
Zipursky explain, courts hold plaintiffs “to an external standard that, to
some extent, ignores their particular vulnerabilities.”153 To state a
“wrong” that was inflicted by the defendant, it is important that the
injury not be the plaintiff’s own responsibility—“for she is using the
legal system to obtain recourse for something done to her by someone
else.”154
The backdrop of a need for emergency assistance helps to
distinguish contexts in which one could describe the victim’s harm as
“self-inflicted.”155 Goldberg and Zipursky explain the distinction:
When a bullet or fist whizzes past someone’s head and
he or she feels fright, that is an emotional response, but
it is quite different from the example of the schoolyard
taunt. The response is visceral, immediate, and
unthinking. In this context, it makes little sense to hold
the plaintiff responsible for the response and makes
much more sense to think of the plaintiff as a victim
who exercised little or no agency.156
153

154

155

156

John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 Va. L. Rev.
1625, 1683 (2002).
Id. at 1683; see generally Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 Conn. L. Rev.
809 (2015).
I recognize that circumstances such as a suicide attempt would constitute a
situation in which “urgent need” and self-inflicted harm would coincide. Further
research could probe a distinction between the initial harm which was selfinflicted and the shock, fear or panic that may have emerged in the wake of
unanticipated consequences of that self-inflicted harm. The objective need for
emergency assistance may flow from the latter.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 153, at 1685-86; cf. Frederick Schauer, The
Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 Ethics 635, 650 (1993) (examining an
argument for a distinction between “belief-mediated” and “non-belief-mediated”
reception of hostile speech, Schauer probes the extent to which responsibility for
the reaction should be transferred from the inflicter to the victim when the
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By limiting the tort to persons in need of emergency assistance, it
would by definition embrace only those persons who could not be
reasonably expected to “steel themselves” against the distress of
exploitative objectification.157 In some contexts where people
experience the harm of objectification it might be reasonable to expect
that they reframe in some way their perceptions. But a serious or lifethreatening emergency is not one of those contexts.
Limiting the tort to those in objective need of emergency
assistance also helps to distinguish situations in which a victim may be
over-reacting—making a mountain out of a molehill—from situations
in which a strong emotional reaction is not only expected but
appropriate.158
But note also that the tort emphasizes the emergency nature of the
assistance needed, which should be distinguished from the emergency
nature of the circumstances which led to such need. Of course
emergency circumstances (such as an ongoing assault or accident in
progress) and the need for emergency assistance may coincide, and
they often do. But the foundation for this tort is a spectator’s exercise
of discretion in order to deliberately encounter a vulnerable person’s
urgent need.
This framework is slightly different from how other theorists
employ the concept of emergency. Note the function of the category of
emergency in Ernest Weinrib’s early proposal for an affirmative
obligation: it is the emergency itself that distinguishes who would be
required to respond. In the words of Cardozo, “the emergency begets
the man.”159 For Weinrib, it is the unusual circumstances of an

157
158

159

victim can “steel himself” against the distress. Skeptical of the capacity to “steel
oneself” in certain contexts, Schauer explains: “Beliefs cannot be switched on
and off at will, and even if the distress that is felt when being the target of an
insult or epithet is dependent on a belief that could have been and yet could be
different, that does not diminish the distress then felt.”).
See Schauer, supra note 156, at 650.
See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 153, at 1686-87 (there are situations in
which “a mountain is a mountain,” and where it is not appropriate to suggest
that the victim should “get over it”: “Indeed, it is quite unreasonable to expect
anything other than a visceral response to an episode of extreme imperilment
and serious injury to another.”).
Wagner v. International R. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437-38 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.)
(defendant whose conduct created an unreasonable risk may be liable not only to
the person who was injured as a result, but also to one who responded to the
emergency with an attempt to rescue: “Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress
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emergency that draw lines around what would otherwise be moral or
social overload, or concerns about fairness in the social distribution of
resources. Weinrib explains:
An imminent peril cannot await assistance from the
appropriate social institutions. The provision of aid to
an emergency victim does not deplete the social
resources committed to the alleviation of more routine
threats to physical integrity. Moreover, aid in such
circumstances presents no unfairness problems in
singling out a particular person to receive the aid.
Similarly, emergency aid does not unfairly single out
one of a class of routinely advantaged persons; the
rescuer just happens to find himself for a short period
in a position, which few if any others share, to render a
service to some specific person. In addition, when a
rescue can be accomplished without a significant
disruption of his own projects, the rescuer’s freedom to
realize his own ends is not abridged by the duty to
preserve the physical security of another.160
I share all of these concerns, but stop short of the conclusion that
the emergency circumstance necessarily defines the contours of the
bystander’s obligation. Respect for both the decision-making process
of the bystander, as well as their subjective and personal qualities that,
notwithstanding the emergency, may render an intervention extremely
burdensome, lead me to draw a distinction between those who remove
themselves from the scene and those who decide to engage.

160

is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in
tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their
effects within the range of the natural and probable . . . The risk of rescue, if
only if be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man.
The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is
accountable as if he had.”).
Ernest Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale L.J. 247, 292 (1980).
Similarly, Goldberg and Zipursky have employed the circumstantial concept of
emergency to limit a potential affirmative duty to assist. In their analysis, the
circumstantial category of “emergency” works to limit legally cognizable harm
to a context which would present neither legal nor moral overload. John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1733, 1837 (1998).
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One might also query whether distinctions should be drawn
regarding the nature of the victim’s needs as they relate to the primary
source of injury, and the timing of the engaged spectator’s encounter
with the victim. Might the obligation to help be particularly acute
when the attack or accident is in course and timely assistance could
mean, for example, the difference between slighter and graver injury,
or even the prevention of death? Further, when time is of the essence
and a particular engaged spectator is the only available source of
potential help, might that element also render an obligation to help
even more intense? In other words, how might the particular
circumstances of the injury and timing inform the duty that an engaged
spectator may have, and the harm that she may cause?
As discussed above, a bystander’s act of prioritization as made
manifest in the decision to stop and to focus at the scene of a
vulnerable victim may or may not align with the objective
circumstances of an emergency. For example, in the case of Karl Ross,
the fact that a true emergency was in course—Genovese’s murder—
did not negate the fact that because of his particular anxieties and fears
he might also have been experiencing a kind of moral overload such
that it would have been unreasonable to demand of him a specific
response.
In contrast to an analysis of circumstances in which “the
emergency begets the man,” in this analysis, the man is already
begotten and is a multi-dimensional human being with an interior life
and decision-making process of his own. This person has certain
qualities and perhaps also fragilities which may make it difficult or
impossible to move toward an emergency circumstance. Obligations
are triggered not because a person “just happens to find himself” in a
position to render aid,161 but because this person has decided to move
toward the person in these circumstances.
Particular concerns about how the bystander conducts him or
herself in the encounter with another human being are contingent on
the victim’s particular state of vulnerability, due to the need for urgent
assistance. But within this framework at no point would the
circumstances of an emergency legally coerce any particular bystander
to go out of one’s way to engage the situation, or to prioritize the
victim’s needs over one’s own. However, a bystander’s decision to
engage the scene indicates that he or she has already “prioritized” his
161

Weinrib, supra note 160, at 292.
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or her time and attention. Once this person has decided to venture forth
toward an encounter with a vulnerable person in need of emergency
assistance, at that point the engaged spectator is responsible for
conducting him or herself in a way that does not objectify the victim in
an exploitative way.
C. The Bystander’s Objectification Rises to an “Exploitative”
Threshold
Practices and habits of objectification between strangers are
prevalent in many pockets of urban life. This is true especially in those
areas of social interaction in which we feel little affective connection
to the other’s interior life, nor expect to receive anything from a
connection with the other. Limiting the tort to encounters with a
vulnerable person in need of emergency assistance helps to keep the
harm complained of within judicially cognizable limits.
But the analysis also requires a further sorting mechanism. Even
when a victim is in need of emergency assistance, pictures or
recordings may be taken for reasons that foster good citizenship,
humane concern for the victim, or both. For example, pictures or
recordings might be submitted to the police in order to initiate or
further an investigation ultimately aimed at affirming the dignity of the
person who was injured, as well as furthering the safety of the larger
community. If on the other hand, pictures were distributed or posted
on the internet with comments that amount to bullying or trivializing
the harm, such would be evidence that the intent was to exploit.
Karen Stohr’s theorization of the moral obligations that emerge
from a face-to-face encounter with another’s needs adds an important
dimension. As noted above, Stohr offers an interpretation of Kantian
beneficence as including not only “the obligation to adopt the wide
maxim of helping others on occasion,” but also “a narrow duty” which
prohibits “contempt, arrogance, defamation, and mockery.”162 For
Stohr the duty not to be “indifferent” sometimes translates into an
obligation to help: “When helping someone is the only way not to be
indifferent to her, we are required to help.”163
The descriptor “indifference” would seem to register a notch down
from “exploitative objectification.” It would be fascinating to parse
whether this might be a case for a hair-line distinction between a
162
163

Stohr, supra note 132, at 61.
Id. at 63.
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narrow duty not to be indifferent to the ends of others—one which is
always required—and a perfect legally enforceable duty not to exploit
others. Behavior rising to the level of exploitation seems to hold more
promise for some kind of external measure of a behavior which
indicates contempt or mockery. Indifference, on the other hand, seems
more difficult to measure. For example, when Ross shut the door in the
face of Genovese’s murder, an outside observer may have interpreted
that as conveying morally objectionable indifference. Subjectively,
however, Ross may have been doing his best to manage an impending
panic attack. Because this Article aims to preserve an ample space of
respect for the interior of life of the bystander, and the corresponding
space to exercise the discretion needed to protect this space, the tort
would require some external manifestation as evidence that the
conduct rises to the level of being “exploitative.”
Does the nature of the primary harm make a difference for how an
engaged bystander’s conduct is assessed? First, for situations arising
from violence, note that there is a double edge to the analysis of how
bystanders interact with technology. Assessing the circumstances of
the attack on Robles outside of the Port Authority, we should be
concerned not only about the engaged spectators’ failure to call for
assistance in response to his medical needs, but also the failure of his
co-citizens to care for the safety of the community as a whole. They
could have helped to arrest and contain further violence on the part of
an assailant who had proved himself to be dangerously unstable.164 At
the same time, in several cases photographs and video recordings of
violence—including violence and abuse of power by the police—have
proven to be important instruments for citizens not only to contribute
to public safety, but also to demand systemic improvement in the
criminal justice system.165
164
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See Arthur Ripstein, Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil and Criminal, 19 Law
& Philosophy 751, 773-79 (2000) (explaining criminal duty to rescue as owed to
the community, grounded in a citizen’s obligation to contribute to social
institutions of coordination).
Arguably the most poignant example, the shooting of Walter Scott, more
particularly the video shot by Feidin Santana, served as a catalyst for broad and
intense discussions of reforming police organizations across the United States.
See Alan Binder & Timothy Williams, Ex-South Carolina Officer Is Indicted in
Shooting Death of Black Man, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/us/former-south-carolina-officer-isindicted-in-death-of-walter-scott.html [https://perma.cc/GFF3-GWTR].
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Second, it may also be important to distinguish between the types
of violence that produced the initial harm. For example, when the
emergency due to violence is sexual assault, as opposed to a robbery
or another kind of attack, is there something unique about the type of
harm that engaged spectators may cause? In particular, is there
something potentially even more disturbing about the exploitative
nature of the interaction and the bystander’s participation in the event?
These questions open the door to consideration of whether engaged
spectators to a sexual assault should simply all be swept into the
category of vicarious liability for the sexual assault itself, because the
nature of the harm in this context necessarily renders those taking
pictures an active and integral part of the attack itself, as participants
and not merely bystanders.166
D. Face-to-Face Encounters, but Not Contingent on Victim’s
Immediate or Emotional Response
The tort hinges on presence on the scene, the encounter between a
person in need of emergency assistance, and the spectator’s
exploitative objectification of the victim in this context. One might
query whether limiting the tort to these circumstances draws a line that
is too artificial, missing something important about a host of other
scenarios about which we should also be concerned. To narrow the
circumstances of this tort to a face-to-face encounter with a victim in
need of emergency assistance is not to downgrade or marginalize
broader ethical questions about what is owed to those we do not
physically encounter. It is simply to submit that direct engagement
with a person in need of emergency assistance requires a different set
of moral and legal categories for analysis.
One might imagine a number of scenarios in which this element is
absent, but various forms of exploitation are nonetheless present: for
example, the person who takes pictures of a vulnerable person on the
scene is not the person who posts them, sells them, or uses them for
166

For a thoughtful analysis of this problem, see Kimberley K. Allen, Note, Guilt
by (More Than) Association: The Case for Spectator Liability in Gang Rapes,
99 Geo. L.J. 837 (2011). Under this theory, “engaged spectators to a sexual
assault” may very well be an empty set—because in this context, they become
the participative audience that actually affirms and perpetuates the violence
itself. But in any case, the exploitative nature of the engagement will depend not
only on the circumstances of how the incident or accident arose, but on other
indications of the bystander’s respect—or not—for the humanity and dignity of
the victim.
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gain in some explicit way. This tort would draw the line at physical
presence—and conduct in the encounter with the victim. Depending on
the nature of the pictures, other torts or regulatory schemes may
address the question of whether the latter person’s conduct provides
the foundation for a different tort.
The distinctions that Judith Lichtenberg draws out in her
philosophical study of “exploitation” in the context of ethical
responses to global poverty are especially helpful at this juncture:
So what is the moral basis for thinking that exploitation
violates respect while complete neglect does not (or at least
not necessarily)? One difference follows almost inevitably
from the fact that two people are in a relationship. Once you
enter into relations with another person you cannot fail to be
aware of him and thus in some sense to acknowledge his
existence; his humanity and his interests come within your
purview. At least as important is what is implicit in the idea
of exploitation: taking advantage of another. To take
advantage of another is to benefit from or even celebrate
their bad circumstances—even if one does not make them
worse off than they would have been in the absence of
interaction—and that seems to amount to using them as a
means in a way that is objectionable. By contrast, simply to
fail to aid poor people on the other side of the world is not to
use them, however else it might be described.167

A second question that emerges from the analysis of a face-to-face
encounter is whether the tort would be contingent on the immediate
response of the victim to the experience of exploitative objectification.
On one hand, one might note the particular acuity of the pain of
exploitative objectification when coupled with public humiliation. As
David Luban explains: “The meaning of pain and suffering, their
communicative content—and therefore the nature of the pain as
experienced by a being that is sapient as well as sentient—depends on
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Judith Lichtenberg, Distant Strangers: Ethics, Psychology and Global Poverty
41 (2014); see also Stohr, supra note 132, at 30 (noting that when one fails to
help nameless others who are starving, “my indifference is not directed toward
any particular individual and it is not ordinarily communicated to them.”); cf.
Henry S. Richardson, Moral Entanglements: Ad Hoc Intimacies and Ancillary
Duties of Care, 9 J. Moral Phil. 376 (2012) (exploring innocent transactions
with vulnerable persons that could lead to “moral entanglements” which trigger
special obligations).
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the context in which we experience them.”168 The contextual element
of experiencing intense vulnerability against the backdrop of
bystanders not only ignoring one’s urgent needs, but preying on the
spectacle as a source of curiosity or entertainment, might be
characterized as a unique dimension of the particular harm. As Luban
notes: “The world of intense pain is a world in which we are incredibly
diminished . . . This is degrading in itself, but when it happens in front
of spectators, the experience is doubly shameful and humiliating.”169
But that said, the tort would not hinge on the immediate response
or reaction of the victim to exploitative objectification and humiliation.
In contrast to the varying versions of the tort of infliction of emotional
distress, this tort defines “exploitative objectification” of a person in
need of emergency assistance as a wrong in and of itself, regardless of
the immediate reaction or response of the victim.
Probing the question of whether the standard for humiliation is
objective and universal, or subjective and victim-relative, Luban
considers an example of an interaction when the victim is physically
unconscious:
A student drinks too much at a party and passes out.
Some malicious wiseacres proceed to undress her and
exhibit her naked body to everyone at the party—
friends, acquaintances, dormmates and strangers. Then
they put her clothes back on, and when she wakes up
and sobers up, nobody tells her what happened.170
Luban draws out an objective standard for humiliation, even if, in a
case like this, the victim “never finds out and never has any subjective
experience of humiliation.”171 Along similar lines, I would argue that
168
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David Luban, Torture, Power and Law 150 (2014) (contrasting torture with
natural childbirth).
Id. at 151; see also Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law of Tort, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 957, 967
(1989) (“Violations of civility rules are intrinsically demeaning, even if not
experienced as such by a particular plaintiff. This is because dignitary harm does
not depend on the psychological condition of an individual plaintiff, but rather
on the forms of respect that a plaintiff is entitled to receive from others.”).
Luban, supra not168, at 145.
Id.; see also id. at 146 (exploring the contours of Jewish ethics, Luban offers a
further example of when the victim has certain psychological barriers to
processing the humiliation as humiliation. A line of rabbinical commentary
would insist that this too is still humiliation: “Declaring forcefully that ‘using an
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the harm of exploitative objectification of a person in need of
assistance can be measured objectively, as a wrong in and of itself,
regardless of the victim’s actual awareness or response. In other
words, the harm as articulated in this tort could encompass not only a
face-to-face encounter, but also a “face-to-body” encounter, where, for
example, the victim was drugged or unconscious such that he or she
was not aware of the humiliation of his or her person at the time.
E. Use of Technology is Evidence, Not a Required Element of
the Tort
Would the harm necessarily be limited to bystanders using
recording devices? Theoretically, no. Recall the earlier discussions
regarding the extent to which cruel objectification was the driver for
moral outrage expressed in response to Bentham’s example of the man
with water at hand laughing at the lady with the headdress on fire,172
Prosser’s image of the man on the dock coolly smoking a cigarette
while another person drowns before his eyes,173 and, of course, the
Seinfeld characters “mocking and maligning” the robbery victim.174
These could exemplify the harm of “exploitative objectification.”
Practically, however, the snap of a cell phone picture, especially
when unaccompanied by any sign of effort to help or to recognize in
some way the gravity of the harm and the subjective experience of the
victim’s trauma, may make the tort case much easier to prove. The
Seinfeld scene of recording the robbery is a good example of how the
use of technology may be parsed. Note how the operation of the
technology was distributed among the characters: only Kramer has a
video camera in hand; and only Jerry has a mobile phone (in the late
1990s, a means to call for help) in hand. Yet all four participate in the
“mocking and maligning” of the victim of assault and robbery.
Technology in the hand of one character (Kramer) fixes the attention
and the gaze of all four, and all four engage the scene as a source of
sarcastic entertainment.
Note also that the tort does not hinge only on how the images or
recordings are used. The use of the technology is indicative of intent.
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insulting nickname for someone in public is the moral equivalent of murder,’ the
rabbis also add, ‘Even when he is accustomed to the nickname’ and therefore
experiences no (subjective) humiliation.”).
See discussion of Bentham’s example, supra note 104.
See Prosser, supra note 4, at 340.
See discussion of Seinfeld Finale, supra note 12.
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The tort itself focuses on the conduct of the bystander when face-toface with a victim in need of emergency assistance. For example,
Kramer’s video also includes a recording of their “mocking and
maligning,” and utter indifference to the victim’s need for assistance.
Regardless of whether the video was subsequently posted or marketed
in some way, the content of the video contains proof of the characters’
exploitative intent—that Kramer and the others were engaging the
scene for the satisfaction of their curiosity or sarcastic pleasure.
At the same time, how the images or recordings were used may be
important evidence for a defense. In this regard, the pleadings and
evidentiary implications are as follows:
1. Any time an engaged spectator chooses to photograph a vulnerable
person in need of emergency assistance, it is presumptively an
exploitative objectification.
2. It is a complete defense for the spectator to show a) that the photograph
or recording was being taken for a benign reason (e.g., to provide
evidence for a police investigation of the accident or assault); and b) that
the photograph or recording was not used in an objectifying way (e.g.,
posted on social media accompanied by sarcastic comments).

VI. CONCLUSION
Like many people, I have been disturbed by reports of what seems
to be indifference on the part of bystanders to the needs of persons in
need of emergency assistance whom they physically encounter. At the
same time, I remain unconvinced by the breadth of some arguments
that bystanders should have affirmative moral or legal obligations to
assist or call for help simply by virtue of their circumstantial presence
on the scene. This Article proposes a more fine-tuned assessment of
moral and legal obligations that appreciates the multi-layered and
subjective nature of a bystander’s encounter with a trauma or an act of
violence that this person has not caused nor exacerbated. On this basis,
I propose a distinction between “pure bystanders” and “engaged
spectators.”
Much as we would all like to think of ourselves as potential heroes,
in situations of violence, shock, and trauma, many of us would be
bumbling bundles of nerves and emotions, conditioned by fears and
perhaps also blocked by a sense of paralysis and uncertainty that
impedes a helpful response. Because people often need discretionary
space to work through their response to violence or trauma, we should
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also go easy on that leap toward “there ought to be a law” that dictates
exactly what should be done and by whom in an emergency situation.
For a host of reasons, some of which have been explored above,
the people whom I describe as “pure bystanders” may choose not to
engage the scene. I make no claim about the morality of their choice.
Or better, my argument also allows space for strong moral
condemnation. Nonetheless, I also argue that this category of
bystanders should not be legally coerced to intervene because I believe
the law lacks the fine-tuned instruments needed to probe the interior
life of bystanders which shapes the contours of their choices.
However, when an onlooker directly engages the scene and the
victim, this person crosses an objective line. Once that line has been
crossed, I argue that the person has entered into a territory in which
legal obligations should attach. The line consists of a visible
manifestation of engagement with the victim in need of emergency
assistance. Bystanders may pass by the scene of a victim in need for
many reasons, including shock, fear, indifference, hurry, or simply
because one was not paying attention. But those who stop to engage
the scene in order to watch and observe may indicate by their very
stopping that they are not afraid, they are not in so much of a hurry,
and they are paying attention to the scene.
Until recently, it was difficult to determine exactly who had
crossed that line into engagement with the scene and with the victim.
Now many spectators have in hand an instrument—a cell phone
camera—through which they can take pictures that document their
presence, thus serving as evidence of engagement, focus, and in some
circumstances, intentions.
The proposed tort of “exploitative objectification of a person in
need of emergency assistance” reflects an effort to define the
obligation that an engaged spectator—one who has in the context of an
emergency made a decision to engage a vulnerable person—owes to
this fellow human being. The tort also crystallizes the distinct harm
that this person inflicts with objectifying conduct, such as taking a cell
phone picture instead of calling for help or helping.
By naming and defining the shape of a tort duty—and so clarifying
that under certain circumstances strangers can and do inflict emotional
and dignitary harm on each other—and by delineating the nature of the
distinct harm that “exploitative objectification” may cause in certain
circumstances, this Article stands as an invitation to explore further the
nature of these encounters, and the scope of what we owe to each other
simply by virtue of the nature of our common humanity.

